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Abstract
In this work, we formalize the problem of barrier coverage, that is, the problem of
preventing undetected intrusion in a particular region using robot sensors. We give
methods for complete barrier coverage in a two-dimensional polygonally-bounded
region, for variable bounded-range line-of-sight sensors. To do this, we define barrier
candidates, which allow us to search a limited set of possible guard configurations
to find the minimum barrier, and convert the problem to a network flows problem.
We extend this result to fixed-range line-of-sight, and fixed-range omnidirectional
sensors. As the methods for fixed-range sensors are intractible, we also give efficient
approximate methods. These approximate methods also use barrier candidates to
quickly find good candidate deployments.
We use these barriers together with noncooperative zero-sum game theory to
construct partial barriers. These are strategies for minimizing undetected intru-
sion when there is a limitation on available guard resources. We give equilibrium
strategies for guards and intruder for the above three guard types in two dimen-
sions. For variable-length sensors we derive strategies using barrier candidates. For
fixed length guards we derive strategies using minimum fixed-length barriers, in
conjunction with thick paths.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this work, we solve a variety of problems related to barrier coverage. Barrier
coverage is the problem of placing robot sensors to act as guards to protect a region
from being entered by an intruder. This problem can be broadly divided into two
classes of problems. The first is the problem of creating a minimum deployment of
guards that successfully prevents undetected intrusion. We call such a deployment
a minimum complete barrier. The second is the problem of deploying guards to
minimize the probability of undetected intrusion. We call this the partial barrier
problem. This second problem is particularly appropriate when the first problem
has no solution, due to guard constraints. We will solve these problems for a variety
of types of environments and guards.
Barrier coverage has a variety of practical applications. In building security
[14, 45], a barrier can be a network of sensors to protect sensitive or valuable areas
from unauthorized entry. In military settings, a barrier can be a security perimeter,
around bases or between enemies. In robot herding [4, 51], a barrier can be an
arrangement of virtual fences that keeps two herds apart, or that protects a herd
from dangerous areas.
Barrier coverage appears in three different fields: coverage, sensor networks, and
computational geometry. In robot coverage literature, barrier coverage appears as
one of the three general types of coverage [17]. The other two are blanket coverage
and sweep coverage. The goal of blanket coverage [19, 37, 41] is to ensure that
every point in a region is seen by some stationary robot sensor. The goal of sweep
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coverage [8, 32, 57] is to ensure that every point in a region is seen by some moving
robot sensor at least once. This problem can also be a single-robot problem [7,55,56].
Barrier coverage differs from the other two types in that its goal is covering every
intrusion path, instead of covering every point.
In sensor network literature, barrier coverage appears as moat construction, or
intruder detection. This is the problem of arranging a set of sensors across a region
to detect an intruder trying to traverse the region. This set of sensors can be viewed
as a barrier, and it can be generated using a variety of methods. For example, [21]
uses potential fields, [11] uses incremental random deployments, and [31] generates
a grid of sensors. In these examples, the barriers are usually generated for rectan-
gular regions that have been preselected as moats around the protected area. The
exception is in examples like [31], where the methods for rectangular moats can be
extended to annulus-shaped moats.
In computational geometry, barrier coverage appears as one of the separation
problems1, specifically the problem of separating two point sets with the minimum
number of shapes of a prespecified type. Some examples of these shapes are line
segments [36], circles [3], wedges [20], or strips [20]. In these examples, the shapes
are used to separate points in open space. In addition, [13] gives a solution for
separating points in a polygon using chords. In separation problem examples, the
set of separating shapes acts as a barrier, protecting the first set from an intruder
who starts somewhere in the second set.
The fields of coverage, sensor networks, and computational geometry give dif-
ferent ideas of barriers, and consequently, different approaches. We generalize the
notion of barrier coverage by combining elements from the different approaches from
each of the fields. We use geometric approaches to accommodate a greater variety
1There is another type of separation problem: separation through motion [49]. This is the
problem of finding the minimum motion necessary to move two sets so their convex hulls are
disjoint.
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of environments, and use sensor networks for a greater variety of problem domains.
This allows us to look at different sensors, different goals, and different environment
layouts, all under the same concept of barrier coverage.
Barrier coverage defines a variety of problems, since the parameters that define
the problem can vary greatly, and each variation constitutes an interesting problem
in its own right. The world can be two or three dimensional, and may have different
terrains. There are a variety of possible guard sensors, including both bounded
and unbounded range, in one direction or many. There are a variety of reasonable
guard constraints, e.g. the number of guards, or energy consumption. Furthermore,
intruders may have motion constraints, that guards can exploit. Any combination
of these elements, and possibly others, produces a different problem, which may
require its own unique solution.
In this work, we address two specific barrier coverage problems: finding the
minimum complete barrier, and finding an optimal partial barrier.
• The minimum complete barrier is the guard deployment that completely pre-
vents intrusion, while using the minimum guard resources.
• In situations where there are not enough guards to form a complete barrier, the
optimal partial barrier is the optimal strategy for placing guards to maximize
the probability of detecting an intruder. This involves also finding the intruder
strategy that minimizes the probability of detection.
We solve these two problems in polygonal environments with polygonal holes for
three types of guards.
• Variable-length segments are unidirectional line-of-sight sensors that can see
up to a range that is specified by the deployer. The cost of a variable-length
guard deployment is the total of all guards’ ranges.
3
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Figure 1.1: Minimum complete barrier for variable-range line-of-sight guards
• Fixed-length segments are unidirectional line-of-sight sensors that can see up
to a preset range. The cost of a fixed-length segment guard deployment is the
number of guards.
• Fixed-range circles are omnidirectional sensors that see up to a preset range.
Like the fixed-length segment guards, the cost of a fixed-range circle guard
deployment is the number of guards.
In Chapter 2 we give an efficient method for determining the minimum complete
barrier for variable-length guards. This work was initially published in [28]. We
demonstrate how to use network flows [23] to construct a minimum barrier in poly-
nomial time. Figure 1.1 shows an example. The guards, with their sensor regions
shown as thick dashed black lines, protect S2 from the intruder, who is known to
start somewhere in S1.
In Chapter 3, we extend the variable-length results by giving barrier coverage
methods for fixed-length segment guards. While we give exact solutions, we also
show the problem is NP-complete. Therefore we also give approximate solutions,
which are derived from the variable-length segment methods in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 4 we extend the fixed-length segments methods to find methods for
fixed-range circle guards. Circles guards have all the capabilities of segment guards,
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but are more powerful, and require some additional considerations. We show that
the minimum barrier problem is NP-Complete for circle guards, and give inefficient
exact and efficient approximate methods derived from the segment guard methods
in Chapter 3.
In Chapters 5 and 6, we extend the minimum complete barrier methods to find
optimal partial barriers. We model this situation as a game, and apply game theory
ideas from [2] to find optimal strategies for intruder and guards alike. Similar ideas
of using game theory for automated security strategies appear in [40]. We show that
an optimal partial barrier can be determined from the complete barrier. Chapter
5 gives partial coverage results for variable-length guards. This work appeared
previously in [29]. Chapter 6 gives partial coverage results for both fixed-length
segments and fixed-range circles.
Chapter 7 describes more long-term research goals connected to barrier coverage.
We discuss them in order to give some insight into the long term prospects for the
proposed research. These are problems that extend from the problems enumerated
in the earlier chapters, but are more open-ended. This includes probabilistic guards,
stochastic deployments, moving guards, intruders with knowledge and learning, and
dealings with terrain and communication.
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Chapter 2
Variable-length line-of-sight
guards in two dimensions
In this chapter, we give an algorithm for finding the minimum complete barrier in the
case of polygonal environments, point intruders, and variable-length one-directional
line-of-sight guards.
2.1 Definition
The intruder is a point moving in the plane with coordinates (xI , yI) ∈ R2. The
intruder can only be in the obstacle-free workspace W ⊂ R2, which is connected,
and bounded by polygons. The intruder is known to originate somewhere in the
start set, S1 ⊂ W , and attempts to travel to some point in the stop set, S2 ⊂ W .
Both S1 and S2 are compact and bounded by polygons. Figure 2.1 shows an example
problem domain.
Each guard defines a line segment of variable length, and thus can be parameter-
ized as qj = (xj, yj, θj, rj) ∈ R2×S1×R+, where (xj, yj) is the position of the guard,
which can see in direction θj up to a distance of its range, rj. Guards are further
restricted in that they must reside in or along the workspace (i.e. (xj, yj) ∈ W ,
where W is the closure of W), and that they cannot see through walls, i.e. past
points not in W .
For each guard q = (x, y, θ, r) we define a visibility region V (q) to be the
set of points that the guard can see. Since a guard can see a straight line of
length at most r up to an obstacle, V (q) is the maximal connected component
6
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Figure 2.1: Sample barrier problem domain. S1 and S2 are, respectively, the intruder
start set and stop set. The shaded regions are obstacles
of {(x+ k cos θ, y + k sin θ)| 0 ≤ k ≤ r} ∩W that contains (x, y). These guards are
called segment guards because the visibility region of each valid guard is a line seg-
ment. In this work we will often describe a segment guard in terms of its visibility
region rather than its configuration.
A set of guards with configurations {q1, . . . , qn} is a barrier iff every path from S1
to S2 in W intersects V (qj) for at least one j. This means that the intruder cannot
move from its start to its intended goal without being detected by a guard. Equiv-
alently, {q1, . . . , qn} is a barrier iff S1 and S2 are in separate connected components
of W −
n⋃
j=1
V (qj).
Our goal is to find the minimum-length barrier, i.e. the set {q1, . . . , qn} that is
a barrier, and has minimum
n∑
j=1
rj. This reflects situations where robots that see
farther are more expensive to construct. Examples of this are long segment guards
composed of many smaller segment guards, or fence systems.
2.2 Barrier candidates
In this section, we define barrier candidates. These are line segments in W that
are relevant in constructing the minimum barrier. We will show that the minimum
7
complete barrier must consist of barrier candidates. Barrier candidates have much
in common with edges in visibility graphs [43].
If f1 and f2 are features in the environment (where a feature is an edge or
a vertex), the shortest segment from a point in f1 to a point in f2 is called the
minimal segment from f1 to f2. This segment is unique unless f1 and f2 are parallel
edges. Not all minimal segments are useful in constructing minimum barriers. For
example, if v is the vertex incident to edges e1 and e2 and the minimal segment from
e1 to e3 has v as an endpoint, the segment is redundant unless it is also the minimal
segment from e2 to e3. In Figure 2.2, the edges labeled a, b, c, and d are minimal
segments. The segments b and c are redundant.
A segment s is tangent to a polygon at a vertex v if inside some neighborhood
of v, the supporting line for s intersects the polygon at the boundary, but not the
interior. A bitangent is a segment tangent to two polygon vertices. This bitangent
is separating if the portions of the polygons in the vertices’ neighborhoods are on
opposite sides of the line through s, and supporting if they are on the same side. In
Figure 2.2, e and h are tangents, f is a separating bitangent, and g is a supporting
bitangent.
We refine our set of barrier candidates further by removing line segments that
are definitely not useful in constructing a minimum barrier. We say that a segment
is admissible if (1) its interior lies entirely inside W , (2) it contains no points in the
interior of S1 or S2, and (3) it is not redundant. The reasons for these restrictions
will be explained below.
Definition: A line segment in W is a barrier candidate iff it is an admissible
segment that is either
1. a minimal segment between obstacle edges,
2. a minimal segment from a vertex of Si to an obstacle edge, and tangent to Si,
8
Figure 2.2: Sample barrier candidates. The dashed lines are not barrier candidates.
S
1
2
S
Figure 2.3: Barrier candidates for Figure 2.1. The boundary is dashed, and obstacles
are solid dark red. The barrier candidates are solid.
i = 1, 2,
3. a separating bitangent between S1 and S2, or
4. a supporting bitangent between different vertices of S1, or between different
vertices of S2,
Figure 2.3 shows all the barrier candidates for the domain from Figure 2.1.
Theorem 1: The minimum variable-length segment barrier separating S1 from
S2 consists only of barrier candidates.
Proof: We will show that any barrier consists entirely of segments that are
either barrier candidates, or can be shortened while maintaining the barrier. Since a
minimum barrier cannot contain segments that can be shortened, it will not contain
segments that are not barrier candidates.
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(a) Before (b) After
Figure 2.4: Shortening by removing portions inside of Si.
First, we show the necessity of requiring that segments be admissible to be
barrier candidates. If a segment’s interior does not lie entirely inside W , portion(s)
of the segment can be removed without affecting the barrier, effectively replacing
the segment by multiple segments of shorter total length. If a segment intersects the
interior of S1 or S2, that portion of the segment can be removed while preserving
the barrier. See Figure 2.4. The requirement that a segment not be redundant will
be proven below. Therefore, we need only consider admissible segments.
Next we show that a segment in a minimum barrier must be one of the five types
enumerated in the definition of a barrier candidate. The segments that can be used
to construct a barrier can be classified according to their endpoints. In general, a
segment can have
1. one endpoint in the interior of W −S1 − S2,
2. both endpoints on obstacle edges,
3. one endpoint at an obstacle edge, and one in S1 or S2, or
10
(a) Before (b) After
Figure 2.5: Shortening by replacing an internal vertex
4. both endpoints in S1 ∪ S2.
We show for each of these cases, either the segment is a barrier candidate, or it
can be shortened while preserving the barrier.
1. If the segment has an endpoint p in the interior of W − S1 − S2, the barrier
can always be shortened. The method of shortening depends on the degree of
p, i.e. the number of segments incident to it.
If the degree is one, the segment does not contribute to the barrier, and can
be removed completely. If the degree is 2, select ² > 0 such that the disk of
radius ² centered at p lies entirely on the interior of W − S1 − S2. Replace
the portion of the barrier inside the disk with a line segment connecting the
two points on the disk’s boundary. By the triangle inequality, this barrier is
shorter. See Figure 2.5. Note that this assumes the angle between segments
at p is less than pi. If it is equal to pi, then the two segments can be viewed as
a single segment, and p is no longer considered an internal vertex.
If the degree is 3 or greater, consider the maximal regions of W separated by
the complete barrier. Each region can be labeled by whether it contains points
from S1, points from S2, or neither (if it contains points from both, it is not a
11
Figure 2.6: Shortening by removing an unnecessary segment. In both cases, the
dashed segment can be removed
(a) Before (b) After
Figure 2.7: Shortening by combining multiple regions.
barrier). Now, consider the regions that meet at this interior vertex. If there is
a region with a “neither” label, or two adjacent regions with the same label, a
segment can be removed. See Figure 2.6. Otherwise, pick two or more regions
with the same label, and combine them with a method analogous to removing
a degree-2 vertex. See Figure 2.7. The resulting barrier is shorter. Thus, no
segment with an endpoint in the interior of W −S1 −S2 can be included in a
minimum barrier.
2. If a segment s connecting two obstacle edges is the shortest possible segment
connecting those two edges, it is a minimal segment, and is a barrier candidate
of type 1. If it is not the shortest, it can be shortened by moving one endpoint
12
Figure 2.8: Shortening a non-minimal segment. The solid lines are obstacle seg-
ments, and the dotted line is a candidate barrier. Moving the endpoint along the
obstacle boundary in the direction of the arrow shortens the barrier.
along the edge towards the minimal segment. See Figure 2.8. The same is true
if s is redundant. For example, in Figure 2.2, c can be moved towards d. If s
contains a point in S1 or S2, then it can be split into two separate segments
that are dealt with in the next item. Therefore, if a minimum barrier contains
a segment that connects two obstacle edges, it must be a minimal segment.
This is a barrier candidate of type 1.
3. A segment s with an endpoint, v1, on an obstacle edge and the other, v2, in
Si can be shortened unless it is the shortest possible non-redundant segment
between the obstacle edge and v2. The method is the same as for the previous
item. That v2 must be on the boundary of Si follows from the requirement that
the segment be admissible. Furthermore, a segment connecting an obstacle to
Si cannot separate S1 from S2 on its own. It needs a second segment segment
s′ incident at v2. If s is not tangent to Si, then s and s′ combined can be
shortened in a way analogous to removing an interior vertex. See Figure 2.9.
Therefore, a segment of this type must be a minimal segment and tangent to
Si in order to be part of a minimum barrier. This is a barrier candidate of
type 2.
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(a) Before (b) After
Figure 2.9: Shortening a non-tangent
4. A segment connecting two points in S1 ∪ S2 can be shortened unless it is a
bitangent, using the method described in the previous item. If the segment is
a supporting bitangent between S1 and S2, then it cannot separate on its own,
and requires another segment. This new segment touches either an endpoint
or the interior of the bitangent. If it touches the interior, it produces a degree-
3 interior vertex, which is covered in item 1 above. If it touches an endpoint,
the bitangent can be removed altogether. See Figure 2.10. If the segment is
a separating bitangent between components of S1, or between components of
S2, then it has no effect. This is because separating components of S1 does not
change the set of locations that can be reached from S1; it only changes which
locations an intruder can reach when starting at each component. Therefore
such a bitangent can be removed. Therefore only separating bitangents be-
tween S1 and S2, supporting bitangents at S1, and supporting bitangents at
S2 can be in minimum barriers. These are all barrier candidates (types 3 and
4).
If there exists a minimum barrier that contains segments that are not barrier
candidates, then this barrier can be shortened using the methods described above.
Therefore it is not minimum; this is a contradiction. Therefore, the minimum barrier
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.10: Shortening a supporting bitangent: (a) is like Figure 2.6; in (b) the
dashed segment can be removed without losing the barrier.
must consist exclusively of barrier candidates. ¤
Corollary 1: All vertices incident to two or more segments of the minimum
barrier must be vertices of Si.
Proof: From the proof of Theorem 1, we know that all barrier candidates have
endpoints at obstacles or Si. Therefore it suffices to show that any point p on an
obstacle edge e is incident to at most one segment of the minimum barrier.
If p is in the interior of e, then it must be incident to a segment perpendicular
to e; otherwise it would not be minimal. There is only one such line; there can be
only one barrier candidate incident to p. If p is a vertex of e, where e meets obstacle
edge e′, then the other endpoints of the barrier candidates incident to p cannot
be perpendicularly over e or e′. Otherwise they would not be minimal segments.
Therefore, both segments must be in the unshaded region of Figure 2.11. However,
if the barrier contains two such segments, it can be shortened as in Figure 2.5. This
contradicts that it is the minimum barrier. Therefore, p cannot be incident to two
or more segments of the minimum barrier. ¤
15
Figure 2.11: Barrier candidates incident to p cannot be inside the green shaded
regions. The red dashed lines are examples of possible barrier candidates.
2.3 Barrier candidate graph and connectivity
network
Given the set of barrier candidates, we construct a barrier candidate graph G =
(V,E). The vertices V are all either (a) points where barrier candidates intersect
each other or obstacles, or (b) obstacle vertices. The edges E are the pieces of barrier
candidates or obstacle edges that connect these vertices. Every barrier candidate
and every obstacle edge appears as a path through G. This graph is finite since for
any two features, there is a finite number of barrier candidates. The exception to
this is when two obstacle edges can be parallel. In this case, it suffices to pick one
perpendicular segment connecting the two obstacles. Section 2.4 shows why this is
true.
Since G is planar, we can define a set F of faces for it. For every cycle in G,
we create a face iff the interior of the cycle’s planar embedding is (a) minimal, i.e.
does not overlap any other edges, and (b) entirely insideW . Any minimal cycle not
inside W is an obstacle, and is not assigned a face.
From G we construct the dual graph [54] GD = (V D, ED). Every vertex in V D
corresponds to a face in F , and every edge in ED corresponds to an edge in E that
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separates faces in F , i.e. a portion of a barrier candidate. If two faces fi, fj ∈ F
share an edge ek ∈ E, then the corresponding vertices v′i, v′j ∈ V D are connected by
an edge e′k ∈ ED. Note that obstacles do not have corresponding vertices in V D, as
they have no corresponding faces in F .
This dual graph reflects the connectivity of the workspace. Traveling from one
point in W to another point in a different region requires crossing some edges of G.
This is equivalent to following a path of corresponding dual edges in GD. Similarly,
separating S1 from S2 requires finding an edge cut C ⊂ ED in GD such that in the
remaining graph GD − C there is no path from a vertex inside a component of S1
to a vertex inside a component of S2. The minimum barrier is the edge cut C that
separates S1 from S2 with the smallest total edge length of all ek such that e′k ∈ C.
We can find the min cut of GD using a max-flow/min-cut algorithm [23]. There-
fore, we construct the connectivity network N from GD by adding (1) capacity values
c (e′k) for every e
′
k ∈ ED, and (2) source and sink vertices vs1 and vs2 respectively.
For each ek ∈ E, c (e′k) is the length of ek. Connect vs1 to all the vertices correspond-
ing to faces that intersect S1, and connect vs2 to all the vertices corresponding to
faces that intersect S2. Assign infinite capacity to all of these new edges to ensure
that the minimum cut of N contains only edges in ED. The same effect can be
achieved by combining all vertices inside S1 into vs1 , and the equivalent for vs2 . An
edge cut that separates vs1 from vs2 corresponds to a barrier that separates S1 from
S2. Figure 2.12 shows the connectivity network derived from the barrier candidate
graph for the example shown in Figure 2.3. The shaded regions are obstacles; they
do not have corresponding vertices in GD or N , as they are not insideW . Note that
while GD is necessarily planar, N may not be if there are multiple components of
S1 or multiple components of S2.
The minimum edge cut separating vs1 from vs2 corresponds via the dual-graph
relation to the shortest barrier that consists only of barrier candidate segments.
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vs1
vs2
Figure 2.12: Connectivity network derived from barrier candidates in Figure 2.3.
Solid edges are in the network, dashed edges are barrier candidates, and dotted
lines are boundaries.
S
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Figure 2.13: Minimum barrier. Dashed lines show corresponding edges in the dual
graph
According to Theorem 1 there are no shorter barriers. Therefore this barrier is the
minimum barrier of any type, and is the desired solution.
This minimum barrier can be found by solving the network flows min-cut prob-
lem, which is equivalent to the network flows max-flow problem [23]. This can be
solved efficiently using augmenting paths [16] or preflows [25]. Figure 2.13 shows
the minimum barrier derived from Figure 2.12. The dashed lines show the minimum
cut for the connectivity graph.
This method scales well to more complex domains. Figure 2.14 shows the algo-
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(a) Barrier candidate graph. (b) Minimum barrier
Figure 2.14: Another example for minimum barrier
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(a) Barrier candidate graph (b) Minimum barrier
Figure 2.15: Environment from Figure 2.14 less one obstacle
rithm applied to a domain with more obstacles and multiple components for S1 and
S2. Figure 2.14(a) shows the barrier candidate graph, and Figure 2.14(b) shows the
resulting minimum barrier. Figure 2.15 shows the effects of removing one obstacle
from this sample problem. A small change to W can create a fundamental change
in the minimum barrier. This suggests that the minimum barrier problem cannot
be solved with incremental methods.
If n is the number of obstacle edges plus Si edges, then there are O (n2) barrier
candidates. Therefore N has O (n4) vertices and O (n4) edges. Since N is planar
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except for edges from vs1 and vs2 , of which there are O (n), according to [33] the
running time for finding the minimum barrier is O (n4 log n) in the worst case and
O (n4) in the average case.
2.4 Accommodating parallel edges
In Section 2.3 we said that if two obstacle edges are parallel, we include one minimal
segment connecting the edges, and ignore all others. In this section, we show why
doing this does not prevent the given algorithm from finding a minimum barrier.
There are an infinite number of admissible minimal segments between two paral-
lel edges, all with the same length. These are all the segments perpendicular to both
obstacle edges. For a given pair of parallel obstacle edges e1 and e2, let QM be the
set of all guard configurations whose visibility regions are such minimal admissible
segments, and select an arbitrary q∗ ∈ QM . In this section we will show that for any
q ∈ QM , and any complete barrier containing q, q can be replaced by either q∗ or a
set of barrier candidates outside of QM without increasing the total barrier length.
Define M = ⋃
q∈QM
V (q). Now consider the components of M. These are the
maximal rectangles containing only points in minimal admissible segments. For
any two minimal segments in the same component, one can replace the other in
a complete barrier while preserving the barrier. Each component is bounded by a
minimal segment that touches either (1) a vertex of e1 or e2, (2) a vertex of Si, or
(3) an obstacle vertex that is not in e1 or e2. Figure 2.16 shows an example pair of
parallel edges, and the corresponding components and boundary segment types.
If the component is bounded on both sides by segments of type 1, thenM has one
component, and all segments can be replaced by q∗. Therefore it suffices to include
only q∗ in the barrier candidate graph. If the component is bounded on a side by
a segment of type 2, this segment goes through a vertex v′ of Si. This segment is
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Figure 2.16: Example parallel obstacle edges. Components of M are shaded. Seg-
ment a is type 1, segments b1 and b2 are type 2, and segment c is type 3.
the union of two segments: the minimum segments from v′ to e1 and e2, that are
both tangent to Si at v. Both of these segments are already in the barrier candidate
graph. Therefore all minimal segments in this component can be replaced with these
pre-existing segments. Similarly, if the component is bounded by a segment of type
3, it can be split into two obstacle-to-obstacle segments, at least one of which can be
shortened further using the methods in the proof to Theorem 1. Therefore all of the
segments in this component can be replaced by barrier candidates while decreasing
the barrier length.
Therefore, when constructing the barrier candidate graph and connectivity net-
work, it suffices to select one admissible minimal segment for each pair of parallel
obstacle edges for inclusion in the barrier candidate graph. Without loss of gener-
ality, this can be the segment with the smallest x coordinate, or if the edges are
vertical, the segment with the smallest y coordinate.
In the case of parallel obstacle edges, while the above theorem still holds inas-
much as every minimum barrier consists of minimal segments or tangents, it is
no longer true that every minimum barrier consists of segments from the barrier
candidate graph. However, since we have shown that every minimal segment can
be replaced with one in the barrier candidate graph while maintaining the barrier,
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every minimum barrier is either composed of barrier candidates, or generated by
replacing barrier candidates with the appropriate segments in QM . This means the
given method is applicable to environments with parallel obstacle edges.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown an efficient method for finding the minimum complete
barrier for variable-length segment guards. The key to this method is the concept
of barrier candidates, which show how the minimum barrier problem is reduced to
the problem of searching through a small set of line segments that are easily found.
The principle of barrier candidates appears throughout the later chapters of this
work. Barrier candidates are key in Chapter 5, where they are used directly in
constructing partial barriers.
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Chapter 3
Fixed-length segment guards
The method from Chapter 2 constructs a minimum complete barrier for segment
guards of variable lengths. For an integral number of guards with preset lengths,
the solution is different, as is the method to find it. In [13] it is proven that for
large enough guard ranges and small enough S1 and S2 components, this problem
is NP-Complete. Therefore there is no known efficient algorithm for the general
problem.
In this chapter we describe methods for finding the minimum complete fixed-
length segment barrier. This is the deployment of the fewest guards, all of which
have the same range r, that prevents all intrusions. In Section 3.1 we give an
inefficient but exact method for finding the minimum complete barrier using Tarski
sentences, and in Section 3.2 we give efficient methods that give complete barriers
that are not minimum, and establish bounds on the costs of these barriers.
3.1 Exact solutions
The problem of definitely determining the minimum deployment with fixed-length
guards is NP-Complete. This follows from [13]: for very small Si components and
very long guard ranges, this subproblem is NP-Complete. Therefore we do not seek
algorithms that are both exact and efficient.
In this section we give a doubly-exponential solution using Tarski sentences [48].
These are first-order logic statements constructed from equalities and inequalities of
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polynomials over the reals with rational coefficients. We write a set of formulae that
are true iff there is a set of n guards that separate S1 from S2. To find a minimum
deployment, we can run this for n = 1, 2, etc. until we find an n such that there is
a barrier for n guards but not n− 1 guards. We can save time by starting not at 1,
but at the length of the minimum variable-length barrier divided by the length of
one guard.
In Section 3.1.1, we define the terms we will be using. In Section 3.1.2, we convert
elements of barrier coverage into Tarski formulae. In Section 3.1.3 we combine these
elements to construct a single Tarski sentence that can be solved to answer the
barrier coverage query. Section 3.1.4 gives the time complexity of this method.
3.1.1 Definitions
Here we give definitions for terms we will use throughout this section. These defi-
nitions are from Chapter 33 of [18].
• A term is a combination of finitely many variables and constants using the
binary arithmetic operators +, -, and ·. For example, x, x21 − 2x1x2, etc.
• An atomic formula is a combination of two terms using a binary relational
operator (=, 6=, >,<,≤,≥). For example, x = y, x2 + y2 > 1, etc.
• A quantifier is existential, ∃, or universal, ∀.
• A Tarski formula is a combination of atomic formulae using boolean operators
(¬,∨,∧) and quantifiers. If Φ (x, . . .) is a Tarski formula, so are ∀xΦ (x, . . .)
and ∃xΦ (x, . . .).
• A variable in a Tarski formula is free if it is not bound by any quantifier.
• A Tarski sentence is a Tarski formula with no free variables.
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• Every Tarski sentence has a Prenex form:
Q1x[1] · · · Qnx[n] φ
(
x[1], . . . ,x[n]
)
,
where x[i] =
(
x
[i]
1 , . . . , x
[i]
ni
)
, φ is a quantifier-free Tarski formula, and the Qis
are quantifiers, alternating between ∃ and ∀.
3.1.2 Formulae for barrier coverage
In this section we define formulae to describe pieces of the barrier coverage sentence.
We will define formulae that describe intersection, point inclusion, and intrusion
paths.
Intersection We define ISECTC (x1, y1, x2, y2, x3, y3, x4, y4) to be the Tarski for-
mula that is true iff the line segment from (x1, y1) to (x2, y2) intersects the line
segment from (x3, y3) to (x4, y4). We can write this as
ISECTC (x1, y1, x2, y2, x3, y3, x4, y4) = ∃t1∃t2 (t1 ≥ 0) ∧ (t1 ≤ 1) (3.1)
∧ (t2 ≥ 0) ∧ (t2 ≤ 1)
∧ ((1− t1)x1 + t1x2 = (1− t2)x3 + t2x4)
∧ ((1− t1)y1 + t1y2 = (1− t2)y3 + t2y4) .
We similarly define ISECTO:
ISECTO (x1, y1, x2, y2, x3, y3, x4, y4) = ∃t1∃t2 (t1 > 0) ∧ (t1 < 1) (3.2)
∧ (t2 ≥ 0) ∧ (t2 ≤ 1)
∧ ((1− t1)x1 + t1x2 = (1− t2)x3 + t2x4)
∧ ((1− t1)y1 + t1y2 = (1− t2)y3 + t2y4)
25
This is like ISECTC , but is false if the intersection point is (x1, y1) or (x2, y2).
The superscripts represent (O)pen and (C)losed.
Inclusion We define INSIDEP (x∗, y∗, x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn) to be true iff the point
(x∗, y∗) is inside the convex polygon with vertices (x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn) in counterclock-
wise order. If we consider the convex polygon to be the intersection of n half-planes,
(x∗, y∗) is inside the polygon iff it is contained in each half-plane:
INSIDEP (x∗, y∗, x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn) = (3.3)
n−1∧
j=0
(y∗ − yj) (xj+1 − xj) ≥ (x∗ − xj) (yj+1 − yj) ,
where we adopt the convention that x0 = xn and y0 = yn.
Guard descriptions We define a segment guard by its endpoints
(
xGiA, y
G
iA
)
and(
xGiB, y
G
iB
)
. A guard is valid iff it has a length at most r, and does not intersect any
obstacles except at the guard’s endpoints. Let m be the number of obstacle edges,
and encode each edge by its endpoints (xjA, yjA) and (xjB, yjB). We define:
V ALIDG
(
xGA, y
G
A , x
G
B, y
G
B
)
=
((
xGA − xGB
)2
+
(
yGA − yGB
)2 ≤ r2) (3.4)
∧
m∧
j=1
¬ISECTO (xGA, yGA , xGB, yGB , xOjA, yOjA, xOjB, yOjB)
Notice the use of ISECTO, which permits the guard’s endpoints to touch the ob-
stacles.
Start and Stop points We now build a formula to test whether a point is inside
S1 or S2.
We describe S1 as a set of M (not necessarily disjoint) convex polygons{(
xS11,1, y
S1
1,1, . . . , x
S1
n1,1
, yS1n1,1
)
, . . . ,
(
xS11,M , y
S1
1,M , . . . , x
S1
nM ,M
, yS1nM ,M
)}
, where each poly-
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gon has vertices specified in counterclockwise order (see INSIDEP above).
Define INS1 (x, y) to be true iff (x, y) ∈ S1:
INS1 (x, y) =
M∨
j=1
INSIDEP
(
x, y, xS11,j, y
S1
1,j, . . . , x
S1
nj ,j
, yS1nj ,j
)
. (3.5)
INS2 is defined analogously.
Undetected paths Consider a polygonal path (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ), where an in-
truder moves from (x1, y1) to (x2, y2) to (x3, y3) etc. until (xP , yP ). We say a path
is valid if it is both feasible and undetected, i.e. if it is possible to traverse this path
without crossing obstacles or guards. We construct a formula to determine whether
a polygonal path is valid.
Let n be the number of segment guards. We define the V ALIDP formula to be:
V ALIDP (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ) = (3.6)
m∧
j=1
P−1∧
k=1
¬ISECTC (xOjA, yOjA, xOjB, yOjB, xk, yk, xk+1, yk+1)
∧
n∧
j=1
P−1∧
k=1
¬ISECTC (xGjA, yGjA, xGjB, yGjB, xk, yk, xk+1, yk+1)
V ALIDP is true iff (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ) avoids all obstacles and all guards.
3.1.3 Barrier coverage Tarski sentence
The goal of the barrier coverage problem is to find a set of valid guards such that
there are no valid paths that start in S1 and end in S2. We first show that, if there
are m obstacle edges and n guards, it suffices to find a set of valid paths such that
there are no valid polygonal paths (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ) for P ≤ m+2n+2. We then
construct a Tarski sentence that is true iff there is a deployment of n guards that
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detects all such polygonal paths.
Lemma 1: For any environment with m obstacle edges and n deployed guards,
if there is a valid path from vS = (xS, yS) to vE = (xE, yE), then there is a valid
path (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ) with P ≤ m+ 2n+ 2.
Proof: For a given W and guard deployment, construct visibility graph [43]
GV = (V,E). V contains all obstacle vertices, guard endpoints, and vS and vE. For
all vi, vj ∈ V , (vi, vj) ∈ E iff the line segment connecting vi to vj crosses neither
obstacle nor guard.
According to [43], every valid path through W is homotopic to a path through
GV . This path through the visibility graph travels through obstacle and guard
vertices; it can be perturbed slightly to become a valid path that does not touch
guards or obstacles.
Consider a valid path from vS to vE through W . If it contains cycles, the cycles
can be removed, producing a shorter path that still connects vS to vE. This cycle-
free path is homotopic to a cycle-free polygonal path (x1, y1) , . . . , (xP , yP ) through
the visibility graph, where (x1, y1) = (xS, yS) and (xP , yP ) = (xE, yE). This path
can be perturbed slightly to produce a valid polygonal path of length P .
Since (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ) is cycle-free, we can set an upper bound on P . Each
(xi, yi) must be distinct; otherwise the path would contain a cycle. Therefore there
can be at most one vertex for each obstacle or guard vertex. Since there are m
obstacle vertices and n guards (each with 2 vertices), there are at most m + 2n of
the (xi, yi) vertices. Adding vS and vE to the path gives a total of P ≤ m+ 2n+ 2.
Therefore, if there is a valid path connecting two given points, there is a valid
polygonal path with at most m+2n+2 vertices that connects those two points. ¤
This upper bound allows us to use (3.6) in a Tarski sentence. To determine if
there is a complete barrier of n guards, set P = m + 2n + 2, and write a Tarski
sentence that is true iff there exists a guard deployment such that there are no valid
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paths of length P . Such a deployment is a complete barrier. Using the formulae
defined in the previous section, we construct this Tarski sentence:
BARRIER (n) = ∃ [xG1A, yG1A, . . . , xGnA, yGnA, xG1B, yG1B, . . . , xGnB, yGnB]
¬ ∃ [x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ]
n∧
j=1
V ALIDG
(
xGjA, y
G
jA, x
G
jB, y
G
jB
) ∧ INS1 (x1, y1) ∧ INS2 (xP , yP )
∧ V ALIDP (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ) (3.7)
Solving BARRIER (n) solves a decision problem, i.e. are n guards sufficient for
a given environment? To determine the minimum number of guards, determine
BARRIER (n) for n = 1, 2, . . . until the sentence is true. Since a fixed-length barrier
cannot be shorter than the minimum variable-length barrier, it must contain at least
W
r
guards, where W is the length of the minimum variable-length segment barrier.
Therefore, to reduce the algorithm’s running time, start evaluating BARRIER (n)
at n =
⌈
W
r
⌉
rather than n = 1.
3.1.4 Complexity
To determine the complexity of this method, we first determine how many sentences,
variables, etc. are needed to construct the final Tarski sentence.
First, we note that a single ISECT formula, defined in (3.2) and (3.3) requires 2
variables and 6 atomic formulae. Furthermore, all atomic formulae are polynomial
in degree 1 or 2.
For this instance, there are m obstacle edges and n guards. Let s1 be the number
of polygon edges in S1, and let s2 be the number of polygon edges in S2. As we saw
in Lemma 1, P ≤ m+2n+2. We break the BARRIER sentence from (3.7) into its
main sub-formulae, and count the variables and atomic formulae. Note that there
are two sources of variables. The BARRIER sentence in (3.7) introduces variables
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to describe guard and intruder locations. The ISECT formulae (3.2,3.3) introduce
ti variables, which describe intersection locations.
•
n∧
j=1
V ALIDG
(
xGjA, y
G
jA, x
G
jB, y
G
jB
)
A single V ALIDG formula requires one atomic formula (to check guard length)
plus m ISECT formulae, each of which defines two ti variables. Therefore n
V ALIDG formulae require 2mn variables and 6mn+ n atomic formulae.
• INS1 (x1, y1) ∧ INS2 (xP , yP )
INS1 requires one atomic formula for every polygonal edge of S1. Therefore,
it contains s1 atomic formulae. Similarly, INS2 contains s2 atomic formulae.
Notice no new variables are used.
• V ALIDP (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP )
V ALIDP contains (m+ n) (P − 1) ISECT formulae. Of these, m (P − 1)
check for obstacle collision, and n (P − 1) check for guard detection. Since
each ISECT formula introduces two new ti variables, this gives a total of
2 (m+ n) (P − 1) variables and 6 (m+ n) (P − 1) atomic formulae.
Adding all of these values, plus the 4n + 2P variables already used to define
BARRIER yields 2m (n− 1)+2n+2P (m+ n+ 1) variables and 6P (m+ n)−5n+
s1+s2 atomic formulae. For P = m+2n+2, this yields 2m
2+4n2+8mn+6m+10n+4
variables and 6m2 + 12n2 + 18mn+ 2m− 3n+ s1 + s2 atomic formulae.
To determine how the variables affect complexity, we convert the sentence to
Prenex form. All the new variables are introduced by ISECT formulae, and all of
these formulae are negated. The ¬ISECT formulae that define V ALIDP are inside
a ¬∃ quantifier; these new quantifiers are of the form ∃ti. The others – defined by
V ALIDG are outside the ¬∃ quantifiers. These quantifiers are the form ¬∃ti. To
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convert to Prenex form, every ¬∃xˆΨ(·) must be converted to ∀xˆ¬Ψ(·). Therefore,
we write BARRIER as
∃ [xG1A, yG1A, . . . , xGnA, yGnA, xG1B, yG1B, . . . , xGnB, yGnB]∀ [x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP , t1, . . . , tµ]
∃ [t′1, . . . , t′ν ] [φ (·)] , (3.8)
where φ (·) is
n∧
j=1
V ALIDG
(
xGjA, y
G
jA, x
G
jB, y
G
jB
) ∧(¬INS1 (x1, y1) ∨ ¬INS2 (xP , yP ) ∨ ¬V ALIDP (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ))
with all of the quantifiers removed. The variables t1, . . . , tµ appear in V ALID
G, so
µ = 2mn. The variables t′1, . . . , t
′
ν appear in V ALID
P , so ν = 2 (m+ n) (P − 1).
The Tarski sentence in this form can be solved using a method given in [44],
which has complexity sΠ(ki+1)dΠO(ki), where the sentence has s atomic formulae
with a maximum degree of d, and the ith block of qualifiers contains ki variables.
We have determined that s = 6m2 + 12n2 + 18mn+ 2m− 3n+ s1 + s2, d = 2, and
k1 = 4n
k2 = 2m+ 2mn+ 4n+ 4
k3 = 2m
2 + 4m+ 6mn+ 2n+ 4n2
Therefore, the BARRIER sentence can be solved with an algorithm with a
complexity of (m2 + n2 + s1 + s2)
O(m3n2+mn4).
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3.2 Approximate methods
Since finding definitively the exact minimum barrier is prohibitively expensive, we
consider more efficient methods for finding a reasonably small complete barrier. We
present four approaches. In Section 3.2.1, we place guards across the variable-length
minimum barrier. In Section 3.2.2 we improve on this by optimizing certain guard
chains, and in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 we give different ways to search for barrier
candidates other than those derived from the minimum variable-length barrier.
3.2.1 Na¨ıve variable-length barrier based method
On the simplest level, we can construct a complete fixed-length barrier from the
minimum variable-length barrier – generated by the algorithm in Section 2.3 – by
replacing each barrier candidate with an appropriate set of fixed-length guards.
Suppose the minimum complete variable-length segment barrier consists of `
barrier candidates, and the length of the jth segment is wj. Then we construct a
barrier using M guards, where
M =
∑`
j=1
⌈wj
r
⌉
.
Since x ≤ dxe ≤ x+ 1, we derive bounds on M as follows.
M =
∑`
j=1
⌈wj
r
⌉
≤
∑`
j=1
(wj
r
+ 1
)
=
W
r
+ `, (3.9)
where
W =
∑`
j=1
wj
is the length of the minimum variable-length barrier.
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We can similarly establish lower bounds on M .
M =
∑`
j=1
⌈wj
r
⌉
≥
∑`
j=1
wj
r
=
W
r
. (3.10)
Therefore, any method that produces a result of
⌈
W
r
⌉
has found an exact mini-
mum barrier.
Combining (3.9) and (3.10),
W
r
≤M ≤ W
r
+ `.
This establishes an upper bound on the gap between the number of guards found
by this method and the number of guards in minimum barrier. Multiplying by r
shows this gap in terms of total guard length:
W ≤Mr ≤ W + `r.
This gap increases linearly with r. This means that the longer the guard range,
the more significant the gap between the sizes of the barrier found by this method
and the minimum barrier.
In the rest of this section, we describe different ways to potentially improve on
this result. In Section 3.2.2, we optimize individual guard chains. In Sections 3.2.3
and 3.2.4 we look at different ways of choosing which barrier candidates are selected
for the fixed-length guard barrier.
3.2.2 Optimizing guard chains using link distance
In this section, we look at improving the barrier described in Section 3.2.1 by op-
timizing multi-link guard chains. For an example of optimizing multi-link guard
chains, see Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1(a) shows a variable-length barrier that surrounds
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(a) Variable-length segment barrier (b) Fixed-length segment barrier
derived from (a)
(c) Shorter fixed-length segment barrier
Figure 3.1: Deriving fixed-length barriers from variable-length barriers
S1. The method of Section 3.2.1 converts this barrier into a chain of 6 fixed-length
segments, as seen in Figure 3.1(b). However, an equally effective barrier can be
achieved using 4 segments, as seen in Figure 3.1(c).
According to Corollary 1 in Section 2.2, variable-length guard chains that are
not straight lines, like the chain in Figure 3.1(a), all involve vertices of S1 or S2.
Therefore, we only optimize segments that are tangent to Si. Any other segments
in the minimum barrier are straight lines, and cannot be locally optimized.
The problem of finding the minimum-link chain through free space connecting
two features (i.e. a chain with one end on one obstacle, and the other end on the
other obstacle) is related to problems involving the placement of planar multi-link
robot arms. Placing the links of such an arm so that the features are connected is
an inverse kinematics problem [5, 27], while ensuring guards do not cross obstacles
or Si is an obstacle avoidance problem [12,46].
We view the problem as a link distance problem, and use a method modified
from [47], that computes link distance between two features (points, segments, etc.).
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The link distance between two features is the minimum number of edges in any
obstacle-free polygonal path that connects them. The path that achieves this, which
we call the minimum link path, can also be viewed as the shortest guard chain with
unlimited-range guards. We will first describe the link distance method, and then
show how to alter it to create minimum fixed-length guard chains.
To compute the link distance from starting feature fs to goal feature fg, the algo-
rithm of [47] constructs window partitions to decompose W into regions R1, . . . , Rn
where every point in Rj is link distance j from fs. These regions are defined based
on visibility polygons: the visibility polygon of a feature is the set of points visible
from that feature. For a single point, the visibility polygon V∞ (q), where q = (x, y),
is
V∞ (q) =
∞⋃
r=0
2pi⋃
θ=0
Vseg (x, y, θ, r) , (3.11)
where Vseg is the visibility region from Section 2.1. For a multiple-point feature f
like a segment, the visibility polygon is the union of all visibility regions for every
point in f .
The window partitions follow directly from the visibility polygons. Let V∞ (f)
be the visibility polygon of feature f . We use V∞ to compute the window partitions:
R1 = V∞ (fs) (3.12)
Rj = V∞ (∂Rj−1)−
j−1⋃
k=1
Rk (3.13)
In other words, each window partition contains all points that can be seen from
the boundary of the previous partition, but are not in any earlier partitions. The
algorithm stops at the first n such that Rn contains at least one point in fg. This n
is the link distance, i.e. the number of links required to connect fs to fg.
This algorithm can be modified to find the minimum chain of fixed-length seg-
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ment guards. We seek the fixed-range link distance, the fewest number of edges in a
polygonal path connecting fs with fg such that every edge in this path is of length
at most r. The path that achieves this is the minimum fixed-range path, and is also
the shortest fixed-length guard chain that connects fs to fg.
For fixed-length guard chains, we make three major changes to the link distance
algorithm of [47]. The first change is to treat Si components like obstacles. This
follows from Theorem 1: any chain through Si can be replaced by one with the
portions inside Si removed while preserving the barrier. This is illustrated in Figure
2.4. The second change is to use a different visibility function Vcirc instead of V∞.
Vcirc (q) =
2pi⋃
θ=0
Vseg (x, y, θ, r) , (3.14)
Consequently, for fixed-length guard chains, the regions Rj are not polygons.
The third change is to divide each Rj into separate subwindows Rj = Rj,1∪· · ·∪
Rj,mj . Each Rj,k is connected, and the Rj,k regions may overlap. These subwindows
reflect the fact that we are not just interested in the shortest fixed-length guard
chain, but the shortest fixed-length chain homotopic to the original variable-length
guard chain. If fg appears in multiple Rn,k subwindows, then there are multiple
chains of length n from fs to fg that are not homotopic to each other. For each
Rj we define the piecewise-connected curve γj to be the boundary between Rj and
Rj+1. The curve γj divides into γj,1 . . . , γj,mj+1 to match the subwindows of Rj+1.
For each subwindow Rj+1,k, the curve γj,k separates Rj+1,k from Rj.
For example, Figure 3.2 gives a variable-length guard chain connecting the point
fs with the bottom horizontal edge fg. We will use window partitions to find the
minimum fixed-length guard chain that is homotopic to it. Figure 3.3 shows some
of the window partitions generated in this process. Figure 3.3(a) shows that R1 is a
disk of radius r about fs, and γ1 is a circle. Figure 3.3(b) shows R2 to be an annulus
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f
s
fg
S1
Figure 3.2: Variable-length chain
minus a section of S1. At 3 links γ3 divides into multiple components (Figure 3.3(c)).
At 4 links R4 divides into multiple components (Figure 3.3(d)). These components
correspond to link chains that travel in opposite directions around S1. While γ4,2
and γ4,3 do intersect fg, they represent paths that are not homotopic to the original
guard chain shown in Figure 3.2. Thus the algorithm continues.
At six links, the subwindows R6,1 and R6,2 overlap. This corresponds to different
chains to the same feature. Figure 3.4(a) shows how R6,1 represents a clockwise
guard chain, and Figure 3.4(b) shows how R6,2 represents a counterclockwise guard
chain. Both go to the same edge of S1.
Figure 3.5 shows the window boundaries up to 9 links, as R9 intersects fg and
represents a chain homotopic to the given variable-length chain. Therefore, the
desired fixed-length link distance for this example is 9. The desired minimum fixed-
length link path is shown in Figure 3.6.
We now demonstrate how to find the window and subwindow partitions. For-
mally, γj = Rj∩Rj+1. If γj is not connected, it is divided into connected components
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γ1
R1 R2
γ1
γ2
(a) One link (b) Two links
γ2
γ3,1
γ3,2R3
R4,1
R4,2γ3,2
γ3,1
γ4,1
γ4,2
γ4,3
(c) Three links (d) Four links
Figure 3.3: Window partitions for fixed-length link distance
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R6,1
γ5,1
γ6,1
γ6,2
γ6,3
γ6,4
γ5,2
R6,2
(a) Clockwise (b) Counterclockwise
Figure 3.4: Six links. The subwindows are not disjoint, representing two different
chains.
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Figure 3.5: Link distance window
boundaries.
f
s
fg
S1
Figure 3.6: Fixed length chain
39
γj,1, . . . , γj,mj+1 . Comparable to (3.13),
Rj = Vcirc (∂Rj−1)−
j−1⋃
k=1
Rk (3.15)
Rj is divided using the components of γj−1 : Rj,k = Vcirc (γj−1,k) ∩ Rj. Here is an
algorithm that, given γj−1,1 . . . , γj−1,mj , determinesmj+1, the number of subwindows
of Rj+1, and the mj+1 components γj,1 . . . , γj,mj+1 .
1. Set mj+1 = 0.
2. For each k = 1, . . . ,mj:
(a) Set Rj,k = Vcirc (γj−1,k) ∩Rj.
(b) Set γ′ = ∂Rj,k − γj−1 − ∂W .
(c) Let γ′1, . . . , γ
′
m′ be the maximal connected components of γ
′.
(d) For each u = 1, . . . ,m′:
i. Set γj,mj+1+u = γ
′
u.
(e) Set mj+1 = mj+1 +m
′.
Continue generating γj and Rj until Rj overlaps the target. Notice that if γj,k
and γj,k′ intersect, they do not recombine into one component.
Every point p in γj+1 is a distance exactly r from at least one point p
′ in γj.
Furthermore, the guard connecting p′ to p must either (1) be normal to γj, or, (2)
have an obstacle vertex on its interior. With this in mind, we can approximate γj
with polygonal curves.
If the given variable-length guard chain is a loop around an Si component, then
fs = fg. In this case, a starting point is not defined. Therefore, select a point near a
vertex, and use the above method to find the minimum chain around the component
back to the starting point.
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(a) Windows (b) Resulting chain
Figure 3.7: Finding a fixed-length guard chain from the left edge, around the trian-
gle, to the bottom edge
Figure 3.7(a) gives an example where the starting feature is the far-left boundary.
The resulting chain is shown in Figure 3.7(b).
Applying this method to each multi-link barrier component will often produce
a shorter barrier than simply covering the variable-length barrier with fixed-length
guards.
In our experiments, we used polygonal curves to approximate each γj. With
high enough link distances resolution may be a problem; a very dense sampling of
γ1 may be necessary in order to find any appropriate points in γn. In this case, it
may be worthwhile to view γj analytically.
Each γj,k can be viewed as a continuous function γj,k : [0, 1] → C, oriented
counterclockwise around Rj. Then each γj+1 component is composed of pieces
ηj,k,u : [0, 1]→ C, where each η is derived from γj,k via the two types of guards that
connect γj to γj+1: normals to γj, and tangents to obstacles.
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For the case of normals to γj,k, define
ηj,k,0 (t) = γj,k (t)− ir
γ′j,k (t)∣∣γ′i,k (t)∣∣ . (3.16)
Here γ′j,k (t) =
dγj,k
dt
. In other words, for each point in γj,k, move one guard length
directly away from Rj. This point is in ηi,k,0.
Similarly, for every obstacle or Si vertex vu ∈ C such that |γj,k (t)− vu| ≤ r, we
define
ηj,k,u (t) = γj,k (t) + r
vu − γj,k (t)
|vu − γj,k (t)| . (3.17)
In other words, move directly through an obstacle vertex for one guard length.
This point is in ηj,k,u.
Given these η curves, γj+1 is produced by fitting the η pieces together. This
is done by removing portions of the η curves that involve moving through obstacle
interiors, or appear in multiple η curves; and then fitting the remaining pieces
together at their endpoints.
Figure 3.8 gives the η breakdown of γ4 and γ5. The γi,j,0 curves are produced by
normals from γi−1,j. η4,1,1 is produced by moving from γ3,1 through v1, and η5,2,2 is
produced by moving from γ4,2 through v2.
3.2.3 Selecting alternate barrier candidates using
successive disjoint min cuts
In this section, we describe an additional potential improvement to the approximate
minimum barrier. This approach also considers barrier candidates outside of the
minimum variable-length barrier. We do this because it is possible that the minimum
fixed-length barrier is not homotopic to the minimum variable-length barrier.
There are two major steps in this algorithm. The first is to construct a set of
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v3
v1
v2
η4,1,0
η4,1,1
η5,1,0
η4,2,0
η4,3,0
η5,2,0
η5,2,2
Figure 3.8: Breakdown of γ4 and γ5 into η curves.
complete barriers B0, . . . , Bn. The second is to incrementally combine them into a
composite barrier B∗ that uses the best pieces of these individual barriers.
When constructing the Bi barriers, we prefer barriers that are homotopic to
the minimum barrier. These are likely to be the shortest barriers in terms of total
variable-length guard length. Ideally we would construct the min cut of the con-
nectivity network N , followed by the second-min cut, the third-min cut etc. until
the corresponding fixed-length barrier was minimized. However, the total num-
ber of edge cuts is exponential, and the problem of finding a specific-ranked cut is
NP-Complete [24].
Therefore we instead seek the successive disjoint cuts of the connectivity network.
Let E0 be the minimum edge cut, and B0 be the corresponding variable-length seg-
ment barrier. We define Ei to be the minimum edge cut of the connectivity network
that does not include any edges from E0 . . . , Ei−1, and Bi to be the corresponding
barrier. Each Ei can be found efficiently by taking the connectivity network, setting
the weights of all edges in E0 . . . , Ei−1 to infinity, and finding the minimum cut of
this modified network.
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Figure 3.9: Example on combining two disjoint barriers
For any variable-length barrier B or any barrier component b, we use B˜ and b˜
to denote the minimum fixed-length equivalent, using the methods described above.
We can use the simple method described in Section 3.2.1; we can improve these
barriers by using the algorithm in Section 3.2.2. We write
∣∣∣B˜∣∣∣ to denote the number
of guards in B˜. Using this notation, we are looking for a B′ such that B′ is longer
than B0, but
∣∣∣B˜′∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣B˜0∣∣∣.
Given a set of disjoint barriers B0, . . . , Bn, we construct a composite barrier B
∗
beginning with B0, and incrementally incorporating portions of each Bi, every time
decreasing
∣∣∣B˜∗∣∣∣. For an example of this, consider Figure 3.9. B0 is composed of
all the b0,j segments, and B1 is composed of all the b1,j segments. Suppose r is at
least the length of b1,1. Then B1 is no improvement over B0, as
∣∣∣B˜0∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣B˜1∣∣∣ = 4.
Notice {b1,1} is an improvement over {b0,1, b0,2}, even though {b1,2, b1,3, b1,4} is not an
improvement over {b0,3, b0,4}. An improved composite barrier B∗ = {b0,3, b0,4, b1,1}
contains elements from both barriers, and uses fewer guards than either.
Any Bi can be combined with the current B
∗ to provide a newer B∗, with a
potentially smaller
∣∣∣B˜∗∣∣∣. The individual components of B∗∪Bi can be grouped into
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sets C1, . . . , Cn corresponding to the connected components of W − B∗ − Bi that
contain neither S1 nor S2. If bi and bj are boundaries of the same component, they
are in the same Cj. To accommodate intersecting guards, bα and bβ are also in the
same class if they are incident.
For each j, set Gj = B
∗ ∩ Cj, and Hj = Bi ∩ Cj. If
∣∣∣G˜j∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣H˜j∣∣∣, then set
Dj = Gj. Otherwise, Dj = Hj. The new B
∗ is
n⋃
j=1
Dj. In other words, for each Cj,
take the barrier component that produces a shorter fixed-length chain. Start with
B∗ = B0, and repeat this process for i = 1, . . . , n for some n. Each new i potentially
decreases
∣∣∣B˜∗∣∣∣.
For the example in Figure 3.9, the first two barriers are B0 = {b0,1, b0,2, b0,3, b0,4}
and B1 = {b1,1, b1,2, b1,3, b1,4}. We initialize B∗ to B0, and then combine it with B1.
W−B∗−B1 has two components that do not contain S1 and S2, so there are two Cj
sets: C1 = {b0,1, b0,2, b1,1} and C2 = {b0,3, b0,4, b1,2, b1,3, b1,4}. This reflects that any
intrusion path that crosses b0,1 or b0,2 exactly once must also cross b1,1 at least once;
similarly any intrusion path that crosses b0,3 or b0,4 exactly once must cross b1,2, b1,3,
or b1,4 at least once. Since |{b1,1}| < |{b0,1, b0,2}| and |{b0,3, b0,4}| < |{, b1,2, b1,3, b1,4}|,
the new B∗ is constructed from the smaller sets in each inequality. Therefore B∗ =
{b1,1, b0,3, b0,4}. Notice B˜∗ consists of three guards, while B˜0 and B˜1 each consist of
4.
The question remains how to determine when to stop iterating. At some point
there are no further improvements, or they require too many iterations to be found.
Here are some suggested terminating conditions:
• Stop after a fixed number of iterations.
• Stop when no progress is being made for two consecutive iterations.
• Stop when the length of Bi is greater than r
∣∣∣B˜∗∣∣∣, i.e. the new barrier is
guaranteed not to improve the current one.
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Figure 3.10: The dashed line shows a segment guard that is not in the barrier
candidate graph
The results can potentially be improved further by adding certain overlooked
chains to the barrier candidate graph G before generating GD and N . These are
chains that are equivalent to shorter variable-length chains, but are actually shorter
as fixed-length chains. For an example of an overlooked chain, see Figure 3.10. The
dashed edge is not in the variable-length barrier candidate graph, as it does not
satisfy the definition of a barrier candidate given in Section 2.2. However, for long
enough guard ranges, it is shorter than its variable-length equivalent. If covering
these shorter segments with fixed-length guards requires more guards than covering
the one big segment, then this should be added to the graph. These candidates
would be overlooked in a conventional network flows search, but may be visible
once the “better” candidates are removed from the network.
Per pair of obstacle edges there may be multiple such new candidates, depending
on whether there are holes between the edges. For every pair of edges, we search
for a line segment that connects the two, does not cross any obstacles, and can be
covered in fewer guards than the equivalent variable-length barrier component.
To search a single edge pair (e1, e2), first find all obstacle vertices inside the
convex hull defined by the two edges. For each such vertex v, find the shortest
segment through v that (a) touches both e1 and e2, and (b) does not cross any other
obstacle edges. This is either at the minimum segment through v (if it is obstacle-
free), or the line through one other obstacle vertex. Check each of these to find the
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Figure 3.11: Example workspace
shortest. If it can be covered by fewer guards than the variable-length equivalent,
add it to the barrier candidate graph.
3.2.4 Set cover
We can view each barrier candidate in terms of the paths from S1 to S2 that it severs.
To do this, we use the generalized Voronoi diagram [1] of W . Consider for example
the workspace given in Fig. 3.11. If the workspace has polygonal boundaries (i.e.
is a polygon with only polygonal holes), one can construct a generalized Voronoi
diagram of its vertices and edges. This produces a connected undirected graph.
See Fig. 3.12(a) for an example. Not all edges in this graph are useful for our
purposes though. Edges that bisect adjacent features do not reflect the structure of
W (as they connect vertices to the boundary and nowhere else). Removing these
edges produces the reduced Voronoi diagram ofW . See Fig. 3.12(b) for the reduced
Voronoi diagram of the example.
S1 and S2 can be added to the reduced Voronoi diagram as follows. Let V be the
reduced Voronoi diagram of W , and define c :W → V so that for each p ∈ W , c (p)
is the point in V closest to p. We will apply an additional retraction to V , based on
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(a) Basic graph (b) Relevant edges only
Figure 3.12: Voronoi diagram of obstacles
the components of S1 and S2. For each connected component Ua of S1, retract the
set c (Ua) to a single vertex v1,a. Similarly, for each connected component Ub of S2,
retract the set c (Ub) to a single vertex v2,b. If c (Ua) ∩ c (Ub) 6= ∅, then they both
retract to the same vertex v∗a,b. In this case, v1,a and v2,b will be distinct degree-1
vertices connected only to v∗a,b. See Figure 3.13.
With these vertices added, any path inW from S1 to S2 can be characterized as
a path in V from a v1,a vertex to a v2,b vertex. A barrier can be viewed as a set of
guards that severs every such path.
Using this modified Voronoi diagram, one can look at each barrier candidate as
a weighted set. The weight is the number of guards necessary to implement it, and
the set is the set of Voronoi paths from a v1,a vertex to a v2b vertex that the barrier
candidate severs. A minimum barrier is thus the set of candidates of minimum total
weight such that the union of paths is the complete set of all intrusion paths. This
is a weighted version of the set cover problem.
The set cover problem is this: given a set U and a collection S of subsets of U ,
find the smallest set of subsets whose union is U . The weighted set cover problem
gives a weight to each set, and seeks the set of subsets with minimum total weight.
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(a) Before (b) After
Figure 3.13: Adding S1 and S2 to the Voronoi diagram.
If guards are unbounded, all weights are 1.
Set cover is NP-Complete [24], but there are approximate solutions. A greedy al-
gorithm can be implemented in linear time, and gives a solution withinM (log |U|+ 1),
where M is the minimum barrier size [22], and U is the set of homotopy classes of
cycle-free intrusion paths. This is true of both weighted and unweighted [10] subsets.
The current best performance of an polynomial approximation method for set cover
is (1− o (1)) log |U| [15]. Since the number of paths is exponential in the number
of internal obstacles, this approximation is linear in the number of obstacle or Si
edges. In some environments this is no better than the na¨ıve approach.
Set cover can be applied alternatively by setting U to be the set of ordered pairs
(Ua, Ub) where Ua is a component of S1 and Ub is a component of S2. For an integer
k, the collection S of subsets of U is represented by cycles in G that contain at most
k barrier candidates. The subset of U corresponding to a given cycle is the set of
(Ua, Ub) pairs that the cycle completely separates. The weight on each subset is the
number of guards in all of the barrier candidates in the cycle.
For each k there are O
(
n2k
)
cycles. Therefore, a greedy set cover algorithm
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has a running time of O
(
kn4k log n
)
. If there are m Si components, the greedy
algorithm gives a logm approximation of the smallest barrier that uses chains of at
most k components.
This algorithm is polynomial for a fixed k; a good upper bound for k is `, the
number of barrier components in the minimum variable-length barrier. However,
` can be as high as O (n). Therefore there are environments where this method
cannot be both efficient and a good approximation. This method gives good results
when k is small. For example, if k = 1, all guards in the minimum barrier connect
points on the outer boundary without touching internal obstacles. This generally
happens when guards have a long range; these are also the situations where the
variable-length barrier is least efficient.
50
Chapter 4
Circle guards
Another useful guard in two dimensions is the circle guard. A circle guard can see
in all directions up to a limited distance or to the boundary of W . In open space,
such guards have circles for visibility regions. A circle guard located at (xj, yj) with
a range of rj can be parameterized as qj = (xj, yj, rj) ∈ R2 × R+. The visibility
region Vcirc (q) of q = (x, y, r) can be written as
Vcirc (q) =
2pi⋃
θ=0
Vseg (x, y, θ, r) , (4.1)
where Vseg is the visibility region function from Section 2.1. This is the same function
as in (3.14). See Figure 4.1.
Just as a segment guard with long enough range is a line guard, a circle guard
with long enough range is an omnidirectional guard. Such a guard sees in all direc-
tions, up to an obstacle, with no other limitations.
In Section 4.1, we prove that the minimum circle barrier problem is intractable.
In Section 4.2, we give an exact method for finding the minimum complete circle
barrier by modifying the exact method for segment barriers. In Section 4.3, we
discuss approximate methods. Some of these will be adapted from the segment
barrier methods in Section 3.2, and others will be unique to circles.
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Figure 4.1: Visibility region of a circle guard at q with radius r
4.1 Intractability
In this section, we show that the minimum circle barrier problem is intractable, by
showing that a subproblem is NP-Complete. This subproblem is the problem of
determining if, given a workspace W , start and stop sets S1 and S2, and positive
integer M , it is possible to separate S1 from S2 with M omnidirectional guards.
This decision problem, which we call GUARD-SEP, is equivalent to the problem
of finding the size of the minimum omnidirectional barrier, which is a subproblem
of minimum circle barrier.
We demonstrate that GUARD-SEP is NP-Complete by producing a reduction
from the satisfiability problem (SAT). We show how, given a boolean expression of
the form
p∧
j=1
(`j,1 ∨ `j,2 ∨ `j,3), where each `j,k is a literal of the form xi or xi, we can
create a workspace and define an M such that the boolean expression is satisfiable
iff a barrier of size M exists. This reduction resembles that of [39], which converts
variables into polygons that are connected with crossings and gates.
We convert each variable in the target expression into a polygon with a single
hole. We then connect these polygons to gates that represent the clauses of the
expression. Figure 4.2 shows the representation of a single variable, and Figure 4.3
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Figure 4.2: Minimum barrier representation for single variable.
Figure 4.3: OR gate for minimum barrier. Blue diamonds are S1 components; green
squares are S2 components. This gate represents the clause (xi ∨ xj ∨ xk). To ensure
minimum barrier, place a guard on one of the marked locations
shows the representation of a clause. Figure 4.4 shows a simple example of how they
fit together; it illustrates the expression (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3).
We now explain how the different pieces represent the variables and clauses. Each
variable xi is represented as a polygon with a single hole, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
If there are mi components of S1 and mi of S2, then the minimum barrier for this
environment requires mi guards, achieved by either covering every S1 component,
or by covering every S2 component. We represent the values of xi by the locations
of the guards. A barrier that covers every S1 component represents the statement
“xi is true”; A barrier that covers every S2 component represents the statement
“xi is false”. Both of these covers are minimum, requiring mi guards. Any other
barrier will require more than mi guards. A system of n variables x1, . . . , xn where
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Figure 4.4: Example construction for converting a SAT problem into GUARD-
SEP
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the polygon representing xi has mi components of S1 and mi components of S2 is
satisfiable iff there is a complete barrier with M =
n∑
i=1
mi guards. Note that each
mi is determined by the needs of the construction. It is a function of the number of
clauses the variable appears in, and the total number of variables.
To represent clauses of the form (xi ∨ xj ∨ xk), add the gate shown in Figure
4.3, and connect it to the appropriate variables. Placing a guard at one of the
three marked points separates the Si components at the far left, while covering the
appropriate Si component of one of the variables. If at least one of the literals in
the gate is true, then a barrier can be constructed without using additional guards.
If, in Figure 4.3, xi, xj, and xk are all false, then an extra guard must be used,
so the minimum barrier will be greater than M . For the barrier to be complete,
every such gate must be covered, so
p∧
j=1
(`j,1 ∨ `j,2 ∨ `j,3) must be satisfiable. If the
expression is not satisfiable, then there will be at least one gate that will require an
extra guard, and the minimum barrier will involve more than M guards.
In the example in Figure 4.4, each variable is represented by a loop of three S1
components and three S2 components. ThereforeM = 9. There are two gates repre-
senting two clauses; the gate at the top represents (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3), and the gate at the
bottom represents (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3). The purple circles represent one minimum guard
deployment that is a complete barrier. Since there are 9 guards, it demonstrates
that the expression is satisfiable, with x1 and x2 as true and x3 as false.
To ensure the complete figure exists on a single plane without losing appropriate
connectivity, it is necessary to construct a way for the variable polygons described
in Figure 4.2 to cross. Such a way is shown in Figure 4.5. The large square diamond
in the center is an obstacle. All four components in the middle need to be separated,
and this requires at least 2 guards. To avoid producing a larger barrier, use these
two guards to also cover the appropriate variable’s component. This can be done by
placing guards at two marked points with the same label in Figure 4.5. For xi and
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Figure 4.5: Crossing two variables. Blue diamonds are S1 components; green squares
are S2 components. To ensure minimum barrier, place guards on marked locations
with matching labels.
xj are true, place guards at the locations marked “A”. Similarly, place guards at
“B” for xi and xj, “C” for xi and xj, and “D” for xi and xj. This has the same effect
as if the polygons did not cross, and the guards were placed to cover the appropriate
components.
Therefore, we can use GUARD-SEP to solve 3SAT. For each xi, the polygon
that represents xi will use mi components of S1 and mi components of S2. This mi
value is the number of clauses xi appears in, plus the number of times xi’s polygon
crosses another variable’s polygon. To show that we can construct this instance
in polynomial time, note that we need p gates, and at most 6 (n− 1) p crossings
(moving a literal to the gate requires crossing at most n − 1 other variables, at
most twice per variable). Since each gate requires one pair of Si components per
variable, it follows that M ≤ 3p (2n− 1), and the total number of S1 components
is at most M +2p+24 (n− 1) p ≤ p (30n− 25). This gives a polynomial bound for
the problem size. One can show analogously that the number of obstacle edges is
polynomially bounded.
Therefore, 3SAT reduces to GUARD-SEP, which reduces to the minimum cir-
cle barrier problem. Since 3SAT is NP-Complete, minimum complete circle barrier
must also be NP-Complete.
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4.2 Exact solution
In this section we give an exponential solution for the minimum deployment of circle
guards using Tarski sentences. The method resembles the one in Section 3.1, and
uses the same formulae from that section.
Recall that a circle guard deployment is a complete barrier if every path from
S1 to S2 crosses the visibility region of some guard qi located at (xi, yi). For the
intrusion path to cross this guard’s visibility region, it must intersect at least one
point (x′i, y
′
i) ∈ V (qi). Since q sees this point, the line from (xi, yi) to (x′i, y′i) must
be a valid segment guard.
With this in mind, a circle barrier can be viewed as a segment guard deployment
where only the guard locations are initially selected. Once the intruder selects a
path, the guards select directions. If there is at least one guard that has at least
one direction that detects the intruder, then a circle guard at that location would
detect the intruder. If this is true for every intrusion path, then the circle guard
deployment would detect all intrusion paths, and must be a complete barrier.
Therefore we can take the Tarksi sentence for segment barriers, and rearrange
the quantifiers to produce a sentence for circle barriers. Recall from (3.8) that the
Tarski sentence for segment guards is
∃ [xG1A, yG1A, . . . , xGnA, yGnA, xG1B, yG1B, . . . , xGnB, yGnB]∀ [x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP , t1, . . . , tµ]
∃ [t′1, . . . , t′ν ] [φ (·)] ,
where φ (·) is
n∧
j=1
V ALIDG
(
xGjA, y
G
jA, x
G
jB, y
G
jB
) ∧(¬INS1 (x1, y1) ∨ ¬INS2 (xP , yP ) ∨ ¬V ALIDP (x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ))
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with all of the quantifiers removed.
Then BARRIERC (n), the analogous Tarski sentence for circle guards, can be
written as
∃ [xG1A, yG1A, . . . , xGnA, yGnA]∀ [x1, y1, . . . , xP , yP ]
∃ [xG1B, yG1B, . . . , xGnB, yGnB, t′1, . . . , t′ν]∀ [t1, . . . , tµ] [φ (·)] .
The Tarski formula φ is unchanged. For each guard
(
xGiA, y
G
iA, x
G
iB, y
G
iB
)
, xGiB and y
G
iB
move to an inner quantifier block, after the intrusion path is selected, while xGiA and
yGiA remain in the outer block. This is because
(
xGiA, y
G
iA
)
represents a circle guard’s
location, and
(
xGiB, y
G
iB
)
represents the point where the guard detects the intruder.
Similarly, the ti variables used to describe intersection with guards have been moved
inward.
While the number of variables and atomic formulae are unchanged, the ki values
are different. The new values are
k1 = 2n
k2 = 2m+ 4n+ 4
k3 = 2m
2 + 4m+ 6mn+ 4n+ 4n2
k4 = 2mn
This gives a time complexity of (m2 + n2 + s1 + s2)
O(m4n2+mn5).
4.3 Approximate methods
In this section, we describe two different ways of efficiently finding circle barriers that
approximate the minimum circle barrier. Section 4.3.1 describes methods for finite-
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(a) Circles (b) Segments
Figure 4.6: Equivalent circle and segment barriers for a simple corridor
range circles; these methods are modified from segment guard methods. Section
4.3.2 defines methods for unbounded (omnidirectional) circle guards.
4.3.1 Finite-range circles: the circle-segment equivalence
Because circle guards can be seen as combinations of many segment guards, they
can be used much like segment guards. One can place circles across segment barriers
(or segments through circle barriers) to produce the same result (see Figure 4.6).
With that in mind, we can use approximate methods for segment barriers to create
circle barriers.
However, there are two cases in which circles are more powerful than segments.
Once we identify these, we can adjust the segment-based algorithm by either (a)
adding such circles as barrier candidates to be searched, or (b) using them when
converting variable-length barriers to fixed-length barriers.
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The rest of this section describes these cases, and how they can be addressed.
Polygonal curve barrier components
Consider a segment barrier component that is a chain of guards that do not lie along
a straight line. For examples, see Figures 3.1 and 4.7. In some cases it is possible
that placing a circle centered at a vertex of the chain will produce a smaller circle
barrier than the straightforward segment-to-circle map described above. In such
cases, a chain of n guards of length r can be viewed as a chain of 2n guards with
length r/2. Placing circles appropriately yields n circles of radius r/2, i.e. diameter
r. Figure 4.7 is an example of this. Eight circles are used, but the segment barrier
is nine segments long.
To find such cases, every time the resulting segment barrier has a chain that does
not lie along a straight line, break it into segments with half the length, and find
the equivalent circle barrier. This will save at most one guard per chain component.
Circles that are more powerful
The second case to consider is one in which a circle guard does the work of multiple
segment guards. A large enough circle or pair of such circles can completely cover
a small enough polygonal Si component, while at least three segments would be
necessary. Finding such circles is simply a matter of checking each Si component
for size and shape.
Similarly, a large enough circle can guard an entire intersection, a task that can
require multiple segment guards, no matter how high their ranges. See Figure 4.8
for an example of this. We now show that such a circle must touch at least two
different obstacles in order to be more powerful than a segment.
Lemma 2: A circle that touches at most one obstacle1 is no more powerful than
1When we count obstacles a circle touches, we are not counting components in W, but compo-
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Figure 4.7: The circle and segment barriers here are equivalent.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.8: One circle does the work of two segments
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a segment of the same length.
Proof: We use a proof analogous to components of Theorem 1. If a segment bar-
rier separates three or more regions, then the barrier can be shortened by removing
segments or shortening the segment chain. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show one example
of each.
If a circle guard touches one obstacle and no other guards, it is ineffective as a
guard; it can be removed without affecting the barrier.
Consider a chain of multiple circle guards connecting two obstacles such that
each circle touches at most one obstacle. A circle guard at the end of such a chain
can be replaced by a segment connecting the next circle to the obstacle. This can
also be done for a circle guard that touches no obstacles. Consider a guard in the
middle of the chain that touches an obstacle different from the ends of the chain.
Such a chain separates three different regions from each other. Since the barrier only
needs to separate two classes of regions (one for S1, one for S2), at least one pair
does not need to be separated. Therefore, either part of the chain can be removed
while preserving the barrier (compare to Figure 2.6), or the guard can be moved
away from the obstacles (compare to Figure 2.7).
The above process can be repeated for every guard until all that remains is a set
of segment guards. At no time does the number of guards increase. Therefore, circle
guards that touch a single obstacle never offer an advantage over segment guards.
¤
Therefore, only circle guards that touch two or more obstacles can be more
powerful than segment guards. To find these, we look for barrier candidates that
are shorter than one segment. If there are no such candidates, then there are no
circle guards that are more powerful than segment guards. Furthermore, such short
nents inside the circle. Using this definition, a circle that touches two non-adjacent reflex vertices
of the same obstacle is touching two obstacles, not one.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.9: Three circles do the work of four segments
candidates must be near at least one other short candidate, so that they can all be
covered by one circle.
Furthermore, the number of obstacles a single guard touches is relevant. Unlike
the four-obstacle guard of Figure 4.8, a circle guard that touches two obstacles
requires a chain of at least three circle guards to be advantageous (see Figure 4.9),
while a circle guard that touches three obstacles requires a chain of two circle guards
(see Figure 4.10).
4.3.2 Omnidirectional guards
Omnidirectional guards are always more powerful than line guards, as they always
satisfy the condition from the previous section that they see two or more features at
once. Therefore, we construct an approximate method unique to this type of guard.
The problem of omnidirectional barriers closely resembles the Art Gallery Prob-
lem [26]. This is the problem of placing the minimum number of omnidirectional
guards to cover an entire polygon. An n-sided polygon can always be covered
with at most
⌊
n
3
⌋
guards [9]. This bound is tight. The art gallery problem is
NP-Complete [38]. The minimum circle barrier problem for omnidirectional guards
differs from the art gallery problem in that the guards do not need to see the entire
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.10: Two circles do the work of three segments
space; they just need to see enough to protect S2.
To determine what possible guarding power is available to omnidirectional guards
in W , we look at edges in the reduced visibility graph [43] of W . These are bitan-
gents of obstacles, and can be either separating tangents (see Figure 4.11(a)), or
supporting tangents (see Figure 4.11(b)). In either case, extend each bitangent out-
ward from each point of tangency until hitting an obstacle again. The extensions
form a bitangent complement. See [50] for a similar use of these. The bitangent and
its complement divide the workspace into regions; which barrier candidates a guard
can cover depend on which region it is in. In both examples in Figure 4.11, a guard
at region A cannot watch b, nor can a guard at B watch a. But guards at C and D
can watch all three sections of the bitangent 2. The guard’s power changes funda-
mentally at the bitangent complements, and nowhere else. Furthermore, in Figure
4.11(a), if the left grey region is a component of S1 or S2 and not an obstacle, then
a guard in A and C covers the same barrier candidates. Which barrier candidates
2A guard at D, for example, does not need to see all of a; it suffices to see the entirety of some
segment that is homotopic to a.
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(a) Separating tangent (b) Supporting tangent
Figure 4.11: An omnidirectional guard’s power depends on what side of the bitan-
gent it lies.
the guard covers only changes when the guard crosses b. In Figure 4.11(b), if either
grey region is an Si component, then the guard covers the same barrier candidates,
regardless of which region it is in.
We construct an extended visibility graph using the algorithm for constructing
a reduced visibility graph. For every edge of the reduced visibility graph, the rays
extending in either direction from the edge’s endpoints are added to the extended
diagram. Bitangents to start or stop sets only extend on the obstacle’s side, and
only for separating tangents. See Figure 4.12 for an example. These new edges
produce a decomposition of W . Guards in the same region in the decomposition
detect the same intrusion paths. For every region, determine which intrusion paths
it guards. Then apply the set cover methods described in Section 3.2.4. This gives
a polynomial time approximation that is within a multiplicative factor of log n of
the minimum circle barrier.
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Figure 4.12: Extended visibility graph
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Chapter 5
Partial coverage
In previous chapters, we have considered cases for which an adequate number of
guards are available to form a complete barrier. We now turn our attention to
situations for which this is not the case. When a complete barrier is not possible, we
must instead determine how to best use the limited available resources and construct
a partial barrier. To determine the best partial barrier, we need to determine how
to evaluate a partial barrier. Area and sweep coverage have a clear definition of
partial coverage: the area covered as a fraction of total workspace area. However,
this definition does not apply to barrier coverage. Ideally partial barrier coverage
would reflect measures like the percentage of intrusion paths that are blocked or
the probability of detecting an intruder. In this chapter we give a precise way to
evaluate the quality of a partial barrier, and give specific strategies for the case of
variable-length segment guards.
We will define partial barrier coverage as the probability that an intruder at-
tempting to reach S2 from S1 will be detected by at least one guard. For a total
barrier this value is clearly 1. Besides the values that affected full barrier coverage
(W , S1, S2, and the guard deployment), we must now also consider the strategies of
the guards and intruder. The intruder seeks to select paths that avoid the guards,
while the guards seek to select deployments that detect the intruder. Because of
this strategy component, we model the partial barrier coverage as a two-player non-
cooperative zero-sum game of the intruder versus the guards.
This section is laid out as follows. In Section 5.1 we will summarize the ideas
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from noncooperative game theory that will be used throughout this section and
others. In Section 5.2, we show how to apply these concepts and methods to partial
coverage in very simple environments. In Section 5.3 we generalize this to produce
strategies for guards and intruders in any polygonally-bounded environment.
5.1 Game theory concepts
In this section, we review some relevant concepts of two-player zero-sum noncoop-
erative game theory, and show how to apply these to partial barrier coverage. We
use notation and ideas from [2].
We describe partial coverage as a two-player static zero-sum game between the
intruder P1 and the deployer of the guards P2. For P1 an action is a path from
S1 to S2. For P2, an action is a guard deployment. The outcome of this game is 0
if the intruder travels its path from S1 to S2 undetected, and 1 if the guards detect
him. P2’s goal is to maximize the outcome; P1’s goal is to minimize it.
To analyze these games, we determine the optimal strategies for both players.
We start with pure strategies, wherein each player acts deterministically. Since the
game has only one stage, a pure strategy is equivalent to a single action that is
always played. Let γ be an intrusion path from S1 to S2, and let q be a guard
deployment. We define A (γ, q) to be the outcome of the game when P1 selects γ
and P2 selects q. To minimize this outcome in the worst case, P1 will select a γ∗
that minimizes max
q
A (γ∗, q). This guarantees an outcome of at most
V (A) = min
γ
max
q
A (γ, q) . (5.1)
V is called the upper value of A. Similarly, to maximize this outcome in the worst
case, P2 will select a q∗ that maximizes min
γ
A (γ, q∗). This guarantees an outcome
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of at least
V (A) = max
q
min
γ
A (γ, q) . (5.2)
V is called the lower value of A. If both players play these strategies, the game’s
outcome will always be between V and V . If V = V , then γ∗ and q∗ form equilibrium
strategies for A. The pair (γ∗, q∗) is also called a saddle point for pure strategies.
The value of such a game is V = V = V . Each player can guarantee an outcome
of V or better by playing his equilibrium strategy, but cannot guarantee anything
better. If a player plays a strategy that is not an equilibrium, then it is possible for
the outcome to be worse for that player.
Equivalently, (γ∗, q∗) is a saddle point iff for all γ and q,
A (γ∗, q) ≤ A (γ∗, q∗) ≤ A (γ, q∗) . (5.3)
In other words, a strategy is an equilibrium strategy iff neither player can improve
his outcome by unilaterally deviating from the strategy.
For every partial coverage game, every guard deployment has an intrusion path
that avoids it. Therefore, V = 0. Similarly, every intrusion path has a guard
deployment that detects it. Therefore, V = 1. Since V < V , there are no saddle
points for pure strategies.
Since pure equilibrium strategies do not exist for partial barrier games, to find
equilibrium strategies it is necessary to use mixed strategies. A mixed strategy is
defined as a probability distribution over a player’s possible actions. Again following
the notation of [2], we use yi to denote the probability that P1 plays the path γi, and
zj to denote the probability thatP2 plays the deployment qj. When mixed strategies
are used, these strategies can be evaluated by determining Ey,z {A}, the expected
value of the outcome with respect to the probability distributions represented by
y and z. When using mixed strategies in partial coverage problems, we define the
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coverage value to be this expected outcome. Thus, the coverage value is equal to
the probability that the guards detect the intruder. As above, P1 seeks to minimize
this value, while P2 seeks to maximize it.
The mixed strategies analogies of (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) are
V m (A) = min
y
max
z
Ey,z {A} (5.4)
V m (A) = max
z
min
y
Ey,z {A} (5.5)
Ey∗,z {A} ≤ Ey∗,z∗ {A} ≤ Ey,z∗ {A} . (5.6)
Unlike pure strategies, for mixed strategies we are guaranteed V m (A) = V m (A) =
Vm (A), and that equilibrium strategies y
∗ and z∗ exist for any A.
5.1.1 Discrete notation
If the players both have a finite, discrete set of possible actions (as they will in
some of the motivating examples below), we can represent the game with a matrix
A = {aij}, where aij = A (γi, qj). If P1 plays mixed strategy y = [y1, . . . , ym]T ,
and P2 plays mixed strategy z = [z1, . . . , zn]
T , then the expected outcome of this
strategy is
Ey,z {A} =
∑
i
∑
j
yiaijzj = y
TAz.
The equilibrium strategies are written y∗ and z∗, and satisfy
V m (A) = min
y
max
z
yTAz
V m (A) = max
z
min
y
yTAz
y∗TAz ≤ y∗TAz∗ ≤ yTAz∗.
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5.2 One corridor
In this section we show the equilibrium strategies for a single corridor with S1 at
one end and S2 at the other. We will first use simpler examples to motivate the
final strategies, which we will give in Section 5.2.3. The simpler examples can be
represented with matrices and easily fully analyzed, but give insights into how to
construct solutions for more general examples with infinite sets of possible actions.
5.2.1 Discrete, vertical corridor
To discretize the problem of partial barrier coverage in a simple, one-corridor envi-
ronment, consider a row of n doorways in the middle of the corridor, such that the
intruder must pass through one doorway to reach S2. The guards are deployed at
m of those doorways; if the intruder crosses a door that a guard is watching, the
intruder will be detected. Figure 5.1 depicts an example where n = 5 and m = 2.
With this model, P1’s choices are discrete (pick a doorway), as are P2’s (pick which
m doors to guard). Also, since the guards are only at the doorways, the paths the
intruder takes to and from the doorways are irrelevant to this problem.
The example of Figure 5.1 can be represented with the matrix
A =

1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1

. (5.7)
In (5.7), each row of A corresponds to a door (to be chosen by P1), and each
column of A corresponds to a possible placement of guards (to be chosen by P2). It
follows that P2 has 10 actions. For example, the first column of A corresponds to
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Figure 5.1: Discretized corridor with unit guards
placing guards at doors 1 and 2, the second column to placing guards at 1 and 3, etc.
Using this representation of the game aij = 1 if P1 chooses door i, and this door
is guarded by the P2 strategy corresponding to the jth column of A. Otherwise
aij=0.
When using a mixed strategy, P1 chooses y to minimize max
z
yTAz, in which y
and z are probability distributions over actions, as described in Section 5.1.1. To
understand this minimization, note that
yTA = [y1 + y2, y1 + y3, y1 + y4, y1 + y5, y2 + y3, y2 + y4, y2 + y5, y3 + y4, y3 + y5, y4 + y5] .
(5.8)
Here yTAz contains yi1+yi2 for every i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. Therefore the maximum
component of yTA is the sum of the largest two yi values, i.e.
max
z
yTAz = max
j
(
yTA
)
j
= max
i
yi + max
i6=argmax
j
yj
yi. (5.9)
Since
5∑
i=1
yi = 1, The value in (5.9) is minimized by making all yi values equal to
1
5
.
Therefore V m (A) = min
y
max
z
yTAz = 2
5
.
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By a similar process for P2, first note
Az =

z1 + z2 + z3 + z4
z1 + z5 + z6 + z7
z2 + z5 + z8 + z9
z3 + z6 + z8 + z10
z4 + z7 + z9 + z10

. (5.10)
Every zj appears in two elements of Az, corresponding to the two doorways covered
by deployment j. For example, z1 appears in the first and second elements of Az,
since j = 1 covers doorways 1 and 2. Since the zj values sum to 1, the elements of
Az always sum to 2. We can maximize min
y
Az by making all elements of Az equal.
This happens when
Az =

2
5
2
5
2
5
2
5
2
5

. (5.11)
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There are many choices for z that produce this. Some examples are:
z =

1/10
1/10
1/10
1/10
1/10
1/10
1/10
1/10
1/10
1/10

,

1/5
0
0
1/5
1/5
0
0
1/5
0
1/5

,

0
1/5
1/5
0
0
1/5
1/5
0
1/5
0

, . . . (5.12)
Any strategy that covers each doorway with a 2
5
probability satisfies this. There-
fore,
V m (A) = max
z
min
y
yTAz = 2
5
. Since V m (A) = V m (A) =
2
5
, these are equilibrium
strategies, and
Vm (A) =
2
5
. Therefore, the equilibrium strategies are for the intruder to select each
doorway with equal probability 1
5
, and for the guards to cover each doorway with
equal probability 2
5
.
This reasoning can be generalized for any m and n, where m < n. A is an
n× (n
m
)
matrix, and yTA contains
∑
i∈S
yi for every S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with m members.
Compare to (5.8). Therefore, max
z
yTA is the sum of the largest m yi values, and it
is minimized by setting every yi to
1
n . With this choice of y, every element of y
TA
is
m
n .
Similarly, Az contains n entries, each of which is a sum of
(
n−1
m−1
)
terms. The
ith element is the sum of all the zj values such that deployment j covers doorway
i. Compare to (5.10). Since each deployment covers m doorways, each zj value
74
appears m times in Az. Therefore, the elements of Az always sum to m. Therefore,
min
y
Az can be maximized by setting each element of Az to
m
n . One way to do this
is to set zj =
1
(nm)
for every j, as
(
n−1
m−1
)
/
(
n
m
)
= mn . As we saw in (5.12), this
is not the only equilibrium strategy for P2.
Therefore, Vm (A) = V m (A) = V m (A) =
m
n
. Equilibrium strategies are for
the intruder to select each doorway with equal probability 1
n
, and for the guards to
cover each doorway with equal probability m
n
. Notice that the intruder’s equilibrium
strategy is unchanged by a change in m.
5.2.2 Continuous, vertical corridor
We now consider the case of a vertical corridor of width w, and guards of total length
r, which can be divided arbitrarily. P1 selects vertical paths from S1 to S2, and P2
selects (a) a horizontal line L that cuts the corridor in two, and (b) an arrangement
of guards across L with total length r. Since the intruder cannot intrude without
crossing L, each point in L acts like a doorway in the discrete examples. Since the
intruder must cross every possible L in order to intrude, the specific choice of L
makes no difference to the game’s outcome, provided L is horizontal, connected to
both walls, and of minimal length w. Here both players’ choices are continuous.
We can approximate the continuous case with the discrete one by dividing L
into n equal sections, and setting m = arg min
m∈Z+
∣∣m
n
− r
w
∣∣. In other words, select m
so that m
n
best approximates r
w
. This m is the integer closest to rn
w
. According to
Section 5.2.1, the coverage value of the discrete example is m
n
. As n increases, and
m accordingly, m
n
approaches r
w
. The difference is always less than 1
n
. This suggests
a continuous equilibrium strategy with a value of r
w
:
• For P1 select each vertical path with a uniform distribution.
• For P2 use any strategy where each point of L is covered with equal proba-
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(a) 0 ≤ g ≤ w − r (b) g > w − r
Figure 5.2: Using g ∈ [0, w] to place guards uniformly across a corridor.
bility.
There are many equilibrium strategies for P2. Here we give an example of one.
Since L has length w, it has a bijection with [0, w]. Select g ∈ [0, w] with a uniform
distribution, and use it to place the guard(s). If the value of g lies in the interval
[0, w − r], place one guard across [g, g + r]. See Figure 5.2(a). If g ∈ (w − r, r],
place two guards: one across [g, w], and one across [0, r − w + g]. See Figure 5.2(b).
We now show that these strategies are equilibrium, independent of the analogous
discrete strategies.
Lemma 3: The given strategies for the one-vertical-corridor game are equilibrium
strategies.
Proof: Since these strategies guarantee that every point in L will be covered
with a probability of r
w
, they produce an expected outcome of r
w
. To show these
are equilibrium strategies, we show that V m = V m =
r
w
using the definitions given
in (5.4) and (5.5). To do this we show that for each player, any other strategy
produces an inferior worst-case expected outcome. For P1, if the distribution is
not uniform, there is a region of total length r with a probability higher than r
w
of
selection. If P2 places guards exclusively in this region, the expected outcome will
be greater than r
w
. Similarly for P2, if the points in L are not all guarded with the
same probability, there are points with a probability lower than r
w
of coverage. If
P1 selects this point exclusively to traverse, the expected outcome will be less than
r
w
.
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Figure 5.3: Sample single corridor. L′ is an arbitrary barrier, and L is a minimum
barrier.
Therefore, the given strategy is a saddle point, with a value of r
w
. ¤
5.2.3 Arbitrary single corridor
We now use the vertical corridor results to construct equilibrium strategies for an
arbitrary corridor that is simply connected, but whose width and direction can
change arbitrarily. See Figure 5.3 for an example. Let L be a minimum barrier,
which is of length w, and let r be the total guard length, to be distributed by P2.
The equilibrium strategies for the arbitrary corridor are:
• For P1: select a point in L with uniform distribution, and select an intrusion
path through this point.
• For P2: any strategy such that every point in L is covered with probability
r
w
.
The example P2 strategy given in Section 5.2.2 can also be used here. The P1
strategy is not as simple as selecting a point and constructing a path through it. It
needs to be a strategy such that for any line segment of length `, the intruder will
cross it with a probability of at most `
w
. The details are given in Section 5.3.2. Like
the vertical case, this gives a value of r
w
.
Theorem 2: The given strategies for the one-corridor game are equilibrium strate-
gies, with value r
w
.
77
Proof: From Lemma 3, we know that these strategies have an expected outcome
of r
w
. Now suppose P2 places guards across a different barrier L′ 6= L. Since L′ is
not the minimum barrier, it has width w′ > w. In this case, if P1 uses the strategy
described above (i.e. choosing a crossing point from the uniform distribution on L′),
the probability of detection is r
w′ <
r
w
. Therefore, choosing any non-minimum L’
produces worse outcome for P2. Having thus established that P2’s strategy must
choose L as the segment on which to place the guards, the remainder of the proof
follows directly from Lemma 3.
Since neither player can improve upon the given strategies, they form a saddle
point, with expected value r
w
. ¤
5.3 General polygonal environments
In this section we use the single-corridor strategies devised in previous sections to
find equilibrium strategies for general polygonal environments. In such environ-
ments, there may be multiple Si components, and multiple homotopy classes of
intrusion paths. We can construct equilibrium strategies by viewing the environ-
ment as an interconnection of corridors. We use Theorem 2 to determine strategies
at a single barrier candidate, and we use the connectivity network N defined in
Section 2.3 to combine these different strategies.
In Section 5.3.1, we give general rules that dictate intruder and guard strategies
for polygonal environments. While P2’s strategy can be derived directly from these
rules, P1’s strategy is more complicated; the details are given in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 General strategies
We use G and N from Section 2.3 to construct strategies for partial coverage in
polygonal environments. We make use of the following lemma:
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Lemma 4: Any guard deployment that is not restricted to barrier candidates can
be replaced by a better one that is across barrier candidates.
Proof: Let L be one segment across which guards are deployed which is not a
barrier candidate. L must connect two obstacles; otherwise the intruder could avoid
L entirely, and the game would have value 1.
Let b∗ be a barrier candidate homotopic to L that is shorter than L. That b∗
exists follows from Theorem 1. The area between L and b∗ forms a corridor. By
Theorem 2, placing guards across b∗ produces a higher outcome than across L; it is
a superior strategy. Therefore, every strategy across every L that is not a barrier
candidate is inferior to a strategy that is across barrier candidates. ¤
Therefore, we will only consider guards across barrier candidates. Given this
constraint, we only consider intruder paths based on which barrier candidates they
cross, and where the paths cross a particular barrier candidate.
This game can be viewed as a one-stage game, where P1 selects an intrusion
path through W , and P2 selects a guard deployment. It can also be viewed as
a two-stage game, making use of the barrier candidate graph. In stage one, P1
selects a path through N from vs1 to vs2 ; his action can be encoded as the set of
barrier candidates his path intersects. Similarly, P2 chooses a guard length ri for
every barrier candidate bi (each bi is of length wi). For this to be a partial coverage
problem, the ri values must sum to a predetermined R, which is strictly less than
the length of the minimum barrier, W . In stage 2, P1 chooses which point in each
barrier candidate to cross, and P2 chooses a guard deployment of total length ri for
each bi selected in stage 1.
The outcome and strategies of stage 2 can be determined directly from Theorem
2. Suppose P1 chooses a path through N and P2 places guards such that some bi
is the only barrier candidate that is both traversed by the intruder and covered by
guards. The union of all faces that correspond to vertices in N form a corridor, so by
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Theorem 2 the expected outcome is ri
wi
. Extending this reasoning to multiple barrier
candidates, if P1 chooses a path that crosses barrier candidates {b1, . . . , bK}, then
the game has outcome 1−
K∏
i=1
(
1− ri
wi
)
. This expression follows from the fact that
the guards only need to detect the intruder once for P2 to win. The probability of
undetected intrusion through bi is 1− riwi so the probability of undetected intrusion
through all the barrier candidates is
K∏
i=1
(
1− ri
wi
)
. We denote this value by A (I, r),
where I = {b1, . . . , bK} is the intruder’s path specified in terms of traversed barrier
candidates, and r = (r1, . . . , rN) is the guard deployment.
Given this analysis of the second stage, we turn now to the first stage of the
game. We build strategies for each player using results from Chapter 2 on minimum
complete barriers. P2’s equilibrium strategy is based on the minimum complete
barrier determined using the method described in Section 2.3. Let B∗ be a minimum
complete variable-length segment barrier, and denote its total length as W .
P1’s equilibrium strategy is based on the maximum flow [23] through N . This
flow f assigns a direction and flow value for each edge, such that (1) the flow value
is less than or equal to the capacity; and (2) for each vertex except for vs1 and vs2 ,
the flow in equals the flow out. The minimum cut of a network consists of all the
edges where the flow is at capacity. Let f (bi) be the flow value through bi in a
maximum flow. Since the barrier candidate lengths are used for capacities, bi has
capacity wi; this means f (bi) ≤ wi. Since the maximum flow is at capacity at the
minimum cut, f (bi) = wi if bi ∈ B∗.
Let N be the number of barrier candidates in N . The equilibrium strategies are:
• For P1: Select a path so that for each i = 1, . . . , N , bi is traversed with
probability f(bi)
W
. For every intrusion path I, the probability that I will be
selected is equal to the flow through I divided by W .
• For P2: For each i = 1 . . . , N , set ri = wiWR if bi ∈ B∗, and ri = 0 otherwise.
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Place guards of total length ri across bi.
Theorem 3: The strategies given above are equilibrium strategies for a polygonal
environment, with an expected value of R
W
.
Proof: First we show that the expected outcome is R
W
.
Lemma 5: The above strategies give an expected outcome of R
W
.
Proof: Let E∗ be the set of edges in N corresponding to the barrier candidates
in B∗. Divide N − E∗ into two induced subgraphs N ′1 and N ′2. N ′1 contains all
vertices reachable from vs1 , and N ′2 contains all vertices reachable from vs2 . In the
maximum flow, the flow through edges in E∗ are all directed from N ′1 to N ′2.
Therefore, there are no paths through N of positive flow that traverse E∗ mul-
tiple times, as this would require moving from N ′2 to N ′1. Therefore, every P1 path
of nonzero probability – being a path with positive flow – traverses the minimum
barrier exactly once. If it traverses edge e′i ∈ E∗, then the expected outcome is
ri
wi
= R
W
. ¤
Now we show that the given strategies satisfy (5.6) by showing that each strategy
guarantees an expected outcome of R
W
or better, even if the other player changes
strategies.
First, consider alternative strategies for P1. Any path from S1 to S2 must cross
B∗ at least once. If P2 uses the given strategy, then for any bi ∈ B∗, ri = wiWR.
Therefore the resulting outcome will be at least ri
wi
= R
W
. This value will be higher
if the path crosses B∗ multiple times. Therefore, for P1, using other strategies
produces an equal or higher expected outcome.
Now consider alternative strategies for P2. From Lemma 4 we know that a
deployment that is not across barrier candidates produces a lower expected outcome.
Therefore we write the deployment as r = (r1, . . . , rN), as above. P2 places guards
of total length ri at barrier candidate bi.
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Given an intruder path I, the probability of being detected by a guard is
pG (I) = 1−
∏
{i|bi∈I }
(
1− ri
wi
)
.
We can establish bounds on pG (I), and use these bounds to establish bounds on
the expected outcome.
Lemma 6: If ∀i, 0 ≤ ri ≤ wi,
K∏
i=1
(
1− ri
wi
)
≥ 1−
K∑
i=1
ri
wi
, (5.13)
Proof: Proof by induction. (5.13) is trivially true for K = 1. Assume true for
K − 1.
K∏
i=1
(
1− ri
wi
)
=
(
1− rK
wK
)K−1∏
i=1
(
1− ri
wi
)
≥
(
1− rK
wK
)(
1−
K−1∑
i=1
ri
wi
)
= 1−
K∑
i=1
ri
wi
+
rK
wK
K−1∑
i=1
ri
wi
≥ 1−
K∑
i=1
ri
wi
Therefore (5.13) holds. ¤
Let p (I) be the probability of P1 selecting I. This is the flow through I divided
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by W . The expected outcome is therefore
∑
I
pG (I) p (I) =
∑
I
p (I)
1− ∏
{i|bi∈I }
(
1− ri
wi
)
≤
∑
I
p (I)
∑
{i|bi∈I }
ri
wi
(5.14)
=
∑
I
∑
{i|bi∈I }
p (I)
ri
wi
=
N∑
i=1
∑
{I|bi∈I }
p (I)
ri
wi
=
N∑
i=1
ri
wi
∑
{I|bi∈I }
p (I) (5.15)
=
N∑
i=1
ri
wi
f (bi)
W
(5.16)
≤
N∑
i=1
ri
W
(5.17)
=
R
W
.
In the inequality above, (5.14) follows from Lemma 6, and (5.15) is a rearrange-
ment of sums. (5.16) follows from the facts that (a) p (i) is the flow through I
divided by W , and (b) the flow through a single edge in N is the sum of the flows
through all the paths that contain it. (5.17) follows from f (bi) ≤ wi. Therefore, for
P2, using other strategies produces an equal or lower expected outcome.
Therefore, if either player changes strategies, the outcome will be equal or worse
for that player. Thus the given strategies satisfy (5.6), so they are equilibrium
strategies. ¤
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(a) Non-equilibrium strategy (b) Equilibrium strategy
Figure 5.4: Candidate strategies for the intruder traveling from one barrier candidate
to another. Dashed lines show example paths.
5.3.2 Intruder strategy details
In this section, we describe the details of P1’s equilibrium strategy. The strat-
egy given in Section 5.3.1 only gives strategies for selecting at which points the
intruder crosses barrier candidates. It does not state how to travel between barrier
candidates. The wrong choice of paths can produce suboptimal results.
For example, consider Figure 5.4(a). While the points intersecting barrier can-
didates b1 and b2 are selected with uniform distributions, all paths can be guarded
with a single point guard at g. This clearly produces a much higher expected out-
come than the equilibrium value. A preferable strategy is given in Figure 5.4(b). A
single value x ∈ [0, 1] is selected with uniform distribution, and endpoints p1 and p2
are the locations of x if [0, 1] were mapped onto b1 and b2 respectively. The intruder
moves across the line segment connecting p1 with p2. Against this P1 strategy, there
is no advantage to placing guards anywhere but b1 or b2.
An equilibrium strategy can be constructed by applying this idea to all barrier
candidates. Select x ∈ [0, 1] with uniform distribution, find the appropriate points
in all relevant barrier candidates by mapping [0, 1] onto the barrier candidate and
recording where x is mapped, and connect the points with lines. Cases where the
intruder must chose between multiple barrier candidates are covered later; see Figure
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(a) Non-equilibrium strategy (b) Equilibrium strategy
Figure 5.5: Candidate strategies for the intruder traveling between non-parallel
barrier candidates. Dot-dashed paths show additional barrier candidates, while
dashed lines show example paths.
5.8. Each point in [0, 1] corresponds to a unique intrusion path.
This is not sufficient, as evidenced by the example in Figure 5.5(a). Guard g
clearly covers all paths, even though it is shorter than b1 or b2. The problem is neither
the selection of x, the choice of points in barrier candidates, nor the connections
between them. Rather, the intruder does not make adequate use of the polygon.
The desired strategy is shown in Figure 5.5(b). Notice the absence of untraversed
regions. This strategy is achieved by (a) triangulating non-triangular faces, and (b)
adding altitudes to appropriate triangles. More specifically, for any triangular face
with one in edge and one out edge, add the altitude to the edge with no flow. If
there is an adjacent triangular face, add an edge to the opposite vertex. See Figure
5.6.
Continue dividing triangles until there are no such triangles. All triangular faces
now either (1) have no flow, (2) are right triangles with one zero-flow leg, or (3)
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(a) Before (b) After, (c) After,
without adjacent face with adjacent face.
Figure 5.6: Transforming a triangle with one 0-flow edge. Barrier candidates are
black and solid; network edges are colored and dot-dashed.
(a) Triangle, with flows (b) Example intruder paths
Figure 5.7: Intruder strategy across a right triangle with a zero-flow leg. Barrier can-
didates are black and solid, network edges are colored and dot-dashed, and intruder
paths are dashed.
have flow through all three legs. The intruder will not travel through faces of type
(1). When moving through type (2), he will use paths parallel to the zero-flow leg.
See Figure 5.7. A face of type (3) has either 2 in edges and 1 out, or vice versa.
In Figure 5.8(a), triangle ABC has input flow of α through AB, input flow of β
through BC, and output flow of α + β through AC. The intruder will use paths
parallel to BD, where D is selected so that AD
DC
= α
β
. Figure 5.8(b) shows these
paths. If there are two edges flowing out and one in, simply reverse the directions
from Figure 5.8(b).
In the third case, the shortest guard that covers every path is not AC, but a
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(a) Triangle, with flows (b) Example intruder paths (c) Minimum guard
deployment (thick red).
Figure 5.8: Intruder strategy across a triangle with three nonzero-flow edges. Bar-
rier candidates are black and solid, network edges are colored and dot-dashed, and
intruder paths are dashed.
set of guards perpendicular to AD, shown in Figure 5.8(3). The total length is
AC sin θ, where θ is the measure of ∠ADB. As long as this value is no less than
α + β, this strategy is still equilibrium, as this guard is not an improvement over
the minimum barrier. If AC is part of the minimum barrier, then θ = pi
2
is forced,
meaning BD ⊥ AC. In this case, BD is added to the connectivity network with a
capacity of 0. This does not decrease the minimum barrier, as any barrier containing
these 0-capacity edges involves a trapezoid like in Figure 5.9. In the figure, z0 and
z1 are new 0-capacity edges, both of which are perpendicular to b
∗. It is impossible
for b′ to be shorter than b∗. Therefore any such b′ cannot be in the minimum barrier;
its corresponding edge cannot be in the minimum cut. Since any cut that does not
contain 0-capacity edges is a barrier in the original connectivity network, it cannot
be the minimum. Therefore, adding these edges does not change the minimum cut.
This method produces equilibrium strategies for P1. The intruder selects x ∈
[0, 1] with uniform distribution, and uses it to select a point along the edge of S1.
The intruder will then follow the given paths through the triangles of the extended
barrier candidate graph until arriving at S2.
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Figure 5.9: Trapezoid generated by exploiting 0-capacity edges z0 and z1. This
shows that the minimum cut will contain b∗ and not b′.
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Chapter 6
Partial coverage for fixed-length
guards
In this chapter, we give partial coverage values and strategies for fixed-length guards.
We give methods for both segment and circle guards. We will show how the meth-
ods relate to two NP-Complete problems: minimum fixed-length complete barrier,
described in Chapters 3 and 4, and maximum thick paths [42].
In Section 6.1 we give strategies for one discretized corridor. We use this in
Section 6.2 to build continuous single-corridor strategies. In Section 6.3 we use the
single-corridor strategies to motivate strategies for general environments. We give
strategies for circle guards in Section 6.3.1, and derive segment guard strategies from
them in Section 6.3.2.
6.1 One discrete corridor
In this section, we give strategies for a single vertical corridor, with S1 at the bottom
and S2 at the top. We model the corridor as a discrete set of doorways, like the
examples in Section 5.2.1. Like Section 5.2.1, we will use the discrete notation of
Section 5.1.1, before moving to general notation in the rest of the chapter. In the
examples in this section, a single guard can see ρ consecutive doorways. In this
section, we will show that, for n doorways, and m guards, each of which can see ρ
consecutive doorways, the equilibrium strategies are:
• For P1:
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1. Select ` =
⌈
n
ρ
⌉
clusters of doorways, such that no two doorways from
different clusters are less than ρ doors apart.
2. Select each cluster with probability 1
`
, and choose any doorway in the
cluster to traverse.
• For P2:
1. Divide the line of doorways into ` contiguous sections, each of which is
at most ρ doorways wide.
2. Select m sections, so that each section is selected with probability m
`
, and
choose any set of guards that cover these m sections.
Using these strategies gives a partial coverage value of Vm =
m
dnρe . This value is
the same for any ρ, ρ′ where
⌈
n
ρ
⌉
=
⌈
n
ρ′
⌉
, even if ρ′ 6= ρ. This has the nonobvious
consequence that a small change in the guard range may produce no change in the
partial coverage value.
To find these strategies, we make use of the concept of domination in noncooper-
ative games. We show that some actions are worse than others, and can be removed
without changing the equilibrium strategies. Removing these actions makes for a
simpler game to analyze. Though we use the discrete notation in this section, the
concept applies equally to continuous games.
In this section, as in Section 5.1.1, we represent the game with the matrix A,
where aij is the outcome of the game when P1 plays action i and P2 plays action
j. Each P1 action corresponds to a row i in A, and each P2 action corresponds to
a column j in A.
Definition: P1 action i1 dominates action i2 if ai1,j ≤ ai2,j for every P2 action
j, with strict inequality for at least one j. Similarly, P2 action j1 dominates action
j2 if ai,j1 ≥ ai,j2 for every P1 action i, with strict inequality for at least one i.
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If i1 dominates i2, then P1 has nothing to gain by playing i2, which never
produces a better outcome than i1, and sometimes produces a worse one. Therefore,
for fixed strategies P1 should never play i2. For mixed strategies denoted by y =
[y1, . . . , ym]
T , where P1 plays action i with probability yi, any strategy y where
yi2 > 0 can be replaced by a strategy y
′ where y′i2 = 0, y
′
i1
= yi1 + yi2 , and y
′
i = yi
for all other i. In other words, y′ plays i1 instead of i2. The new strategy y′ will
produce an equal or better value for P1, regardless of P2’s strategy, even if y is an
equilibrium strategy. Therefore A has at least one saddle point that does not use
row i2. The same reasoning can be applied to P2’s strategy.
By eliminating these dominated options from A, and giving them 0 probabilities
in the computed strategies, we will be left with a smaller matrix, but with at least
one saddle point remaining. Since all saddle points have the same value, removing
saddle points does not change the value. Removing dominated rows and columns
thus leaves us with a smaller matrix in which it is easier to find equilibrium strategies,
without changing the game’s value or losing all equilibrium strategies.
In this section, we derive the above strategies by first deriving them for a single
guard, in Section 6.1.1, and then extending this to multiple guards, in Section 6.1.2.
6.1.1 One guard
In this section we consider the case where there are n doorways, and one guard that
can see ρ consecutive doorways. Consider the example shown in Figure 6.1, in which
n = 5 and ρ = 2. We will first demonstrate how to use domination to determine
the equilibrium strategies for this specific example. We then proceed to the general
case, for any n and ρ. We will perform a series of dominations, alternating between
blocks of rows and blocks of columns, until no more are possible. Lemmas 7 and 8
give rules for dominating rows, and Lemmas 9 through 13 give rules for dominating
columns. This reduces A to a smaller A′, from which we determine equilibrium
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Figure 6.1: Discretized corridor
strategies in Theorem 4.
We describe the example in Figure 6.1 as a matrix A = {aij}, where aij is 1 if
the guard covering doorways j and j+1 detects an intruder going through doorway
i, and 0 otherwise. Equivalently, aij = 1 if i ∈ {j, j + 1}, and aij = 0 otherwise.
Therefore,
A =

1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1

. (6.1)
As in section 5.2.1, V = 1 and V = 0 for pure strategies, so there are no pure
equilibrium strategies. Therefore we look at mixed strategies y and z.
We can reduce A by exploiting domination between rows. In this example,
a1j ≤ a2j for every j , with strict inequality at j = 2; therefore row 1 dominates row
2. Similarly, since a5j ≤ a4j, with strict inequality at j = 4, row 5 dominates row 4.
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Therefore we eliminate rows 2 and 4, producing a reduced game matrix:
A′ =

1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
 . (6.2)
We also have a reducedP1 strategy y′ = (y1, y3, y5)
T . Since y′TA′ = (y1, y3, y3, y5),
P2 will maximize the outcome by playing the column with the maximum yi value.
Therefore, max
z
y′TA′z = max (y1, y3, y5). Since y1 + y3 + y5 = 1, this value can be
minimized by setting y1 = y3 = y5 =
1
3
. Therefore
V m (A
′) = min
y
max
z
y′TA′z = 1
3
.
Similarly, A′z = (z1, z2 + z3, z4)
T , and P1 can minimize this by playing the row
with minimum value. Therefore, min
y
y′TA′z = min (z1, z2 + z3, z4). Since z1 + z2 +
z3+z4 = 1, this value can be maximized by setting z1 = z2+z3 = z4 =
1
3
. Therefore
V m (A
′) = max
z
min
y
y′TA′z = 1
3
.
Since V m (A) = V m (A) =
1
3
, y′∗ =
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)T
and z∗ =
(
1
3
, z2,
1
3
− z2, 13
)T
are equilibrium strategies for any z2 ∈
[
0, 1
3
]
, and Vm (A) =
1
3
. Returning to
the original matrix, the equilibrium strategies are y∗ =
(
1
3
, 0, 1
3
, 0, 1
3
)T
, and z∗ =(
1
3
, z2,
1
3
− z2, 13
)T
, for any 0 ≤ z2 ≤ 13 . Therefore, the equilibrium strategies are for
the intruder to go through the far left, middle, and far right doorways with equal
probability, and for the guard to cover each of those doorways with equal probability.
If we were to seek equilibrium strategies for this matrix without removing rows,
we would still arrive at y∗ =
(
1
3
, 0, 1
3
, 0, 1
3
)T
, and z∗ =
(
1
3
, z2,
1
3
− z2, 13
)T
. In this case
domination preserved the game’s equilibria. However, in later cases, removing dom-
inated rows and columns will remove equilibrium strategies. This will not change
the value of the game, nor undermine the calculated equilibrium strategies, as we
will see later.
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Now we consider the game for any n and ρ, where ρ < n. We will first describe
the outcome matrix A. We will then use domination to reduce A to a smaller A′
from which it is straightforward to determine equilibrium strategies and the game’s
value.
We define the outcome matrix A to be a n × (n− ρ+ 1) matrix, where aij
represents P1 selecting doorway i, and P2 covering doorways j, j+1, . . . , j+ ρ− 1.
Therefore, aij = 1 if j ≤ i ≤ j + ρ− 1, and aij = 0 otherwise. Equivalently, aij = 1
if i− ρ+ 1 ≤ j ≤ i, and aij = 0 otherwise. This gives a matrix of the form
A =

1 0 0 · · · 0
1 1 0 · · · 0
...
. . . . . .
...
1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1 0
0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 1 1
0 · · · 0 0 1

. (6.3)
A is a band diagonal matrix with lower bandwidth ρ− 1 and upper bandwidth
0, with all bands consisting entirely of 1’s. Alternatively, all diagonals of length
n− ρ+ 1 contain all 1’s. The remaining diagonals contain all 0’s.
We apply a series of dominations to A, similar to the dominations used in the
specific example above. This time, there are multiple rounds of domination, as
removing a set of dominated rows can create new column dominations, and vice
versa.
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Lemma 7: Row 1 dominates every row of A in {2, . . . , ρ}.
Proof: Since the only guard deployment j that can cover doorway 1 is j = 1,
a11 = 1, and a12 = a13 = · · · = a1n = 0. For i ∈ {2, . . . , ρ, }, doorway i is covered by
j = 1, but also by j = 2, . . . , i. Therefore,
ai1 = ai2 = · · · = aii = 1, and ai,i+1 = ai,i+2 = · · · = ain = 0. It follows that for
every i ∈ {2, . . . , ρ}, a1j ≤ aij for every j, with strict inequality when 2 ≤ j ≤ i.
Therefore, i = 1 dominates i = 2, . . . , ρ. ¤
Lemma 8: Row n dominates every row of A in {n− ρ+ 1, . . . , n− 1}.
Proof: Since the only guard deployment j that can cover doorway n is j = n−ρ+
1, an,n−ρ+1 = 1, and an1 = an2 = · · · = an,n−ρ = 0. For i ∈ {n− ρ+ 1, . . . , n− 1, },
doorway i is covered by j = n−ρ+1, but also by j = i−ρ+1, . . . , n−ρ. Therefore,
ai,i−ρ+1 = ai,i−ρ+2 = · · · = ai,n−ρ+1 = 1, and ai1 = ai2 = · · · = ai,i−ρ = 0. It follows
that for every i ∈ {n− ρ+ 1, . . . , n− 1}, anj ≤ aij for every j, with strict inequal-
ity when i−ρ+1 ≤ j ≤ n−ρ. Therefore, i = n dominates i = n−ρ+1, . . . , n−1. ¤
Using lemmas 7 and 8, we can remove 2ρ − 2 rows from A, producing a new
matrix A′, which is (n− 2ρ+ 2) × (n− ρ+ 1) (except if n ≤ 2ρ; see below). How
we proceed with additional dominations depends on the relationship between n and
ρ. Either n ≤ 2ρ, 2ρ < n ≤ 3ρ, or n > 3ρ. In each one of these three cases, the
domination proceeds differently.
Case 1: n ≤ 2ρ. In this case, there are no rows between the largest i dominated
by i = 1, ρ, and the smallest i dominated by i = n, n − ρ + 1. This means that
every row between 2 and n − 1 has been dominated. Therefore there are only two
rows in A′.
Lemma 9: If n ≤ 2ρ, column 1 dominates every column of A′ in {2, . . . , n− ρ}.
Proof: In this case, every column of A′ except for j = 1 and j = n−ρ+1 consists
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only of 0’s. This is because if 2 ≤ j ≤ n− ρ + 1, the guard deployed at j does not
see doorways 1 or n, which are the only undominated options for P1. Therefore,
for every j ∈ {2, . . . , n− ρ}, ai1 ≥ aij for every i, with strict inequality at i = 1. It
follows that column 1 dominates every column in {2, . . . , n− ρ}1. ¤
After removing these columns, we are left with two undominated rows (1 and n),
and 2 undominated columns (1 and n− ρ+ 1). j = 1 sees i = 1, and j = n− ρ+ 1
sees i = n, but not vice versa. Therefore, A′ is the 2 × 2 identity matrix I2. The
domination process stops here. We call this Terminating condition 1, and we will
return to it later.
Case 2: 2ρ < n ≤ 3ρ. In this case, A′ contains a rectangular block of 1’s:
aij = 1 for every i ∈ {ρ+ 1, . . . , n− ρ} and every j ∈ {n− 2ρ+ 1, . . . , ρ+ 1}.
These correspond to the rows between the largest i dominated by i = 1, ρ, and the
smallest i dominated by i = n, n−ρ+1. Since n ≤ 3ρ, there are at most ρ of these,
so they can all be covered by a single guard j, as long as n− 2ρ+ 1 ≤ j ≤ ρ+ 1.
Lemma 10: If 2ρ < n ≤ 3ρ, column ρ + 1 dominates every column of A′ in
{2, . . . , n− 2ρ}.
Proof: For these columns, aij = 1 iff j ≤ i ≤ j + ρ − 1. Since n ≤ 3ρ implies
j ≤ n− 2ρ ≤ ρ, the undominated rows where aij = 1 are i ∈ {ρ+ 1, . . . , j + ρ− 1}.
But we saw before that ai,ρ+1 = 1 for all i ∈ {ρ+ 1, . . . , n− 1}. Therefore, for any
j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2ρ}, ai,ρ+1 ≥ aij for all undominated i, with strict inequality when
j + ρ ≤ i ≤ n − ρ. We know there is at least one such i since j ≤ n − 2ρ implies
j + ρ ≤ n− ρ. Therefore, j = ρ+ 1 dominates every j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2ρ}. ¤
Lemma 11: If 2ρ < n ≤ 3ρ, column ρ + 1 dominates every column of A′ in
{ρ+ 2, . . . , n− ρ}.
Proof: For these columns, aij = 1 iff j ≤ i ≤ j + ρ − 1. Since n ≤ 3ρ im-
1One could similarly show that column n− ρ+ 1 dominates all these columns.
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plies j + ρ − 1 ≥ 2ρ + 1 ≥ n − ρ + 1, the undominated rows where aij = 1 are
i ∈ {j, . . . , n− ρ}. But we saw before that ai,ρ+1 = 1 for all i ∈ {ρ+ 1, . . . , n− 1}.
Therefore, for any j ∈ {ρ+ 2, . . . , n− ρ}, ai,ρ+1 ≥ aij for all undominated i, with
strict inequality when ρ + 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1. We know there is at least one such i
since j ≥ ρ + 2 implies j − 1 ≥ ρ + 1. Therefore, j = ρ + 1 dominates every
j ∈ {ρ+ 2, . . . , n− ρ}. ¤
Note that in both Lemmas 10 and 11, ρ + 1 can be replaced by any column j
where n− 2ρ+ 1 ≤ j ≤ ρ+ 1.
At this point, the dominations have eliminated all the rows and columns except
for (a) the first and last row, (b) the first and last column, and (c) the rows and
columns that produce the rectangular block of 1’s. There are R = n− 2ρ such rows
and C = 3ρ− n+ 1 such columns in the middle. The resulting matrix is:
A′ =

1 01×C 0
0R×1 1R×C 0R×1
0 01×C 1
 , (6.4)
where 1a×b and 0a×b are the a × b matrices where every element of the matrix
is 1 and 0 respectively. It is evident that there are no more dominating rows or
columns. This is Terminating Condition 2, which we will also return to later.
Case 3: n > 3ρ.
Lemma 12: If n > 3ρ, column ρ+1 dominates every column of A′ in {2, . . . , ρ}.
Proof: For any j ∈ {2, . . . , ρ}, the rows where aij = 1 are i ∈ {j, . . . , j + ρ− 1}.
Since j ≤ ρ, the undominated rows among these are {ρ+ 1, j + ρ− 1}. However,
the rows where ai,ρ+1 = 1 are i ∈ {ρ+ 1, 2ρ}, none of which are dominated. There-
fore, if 2 ≤ j ≤ ρ, then ai,ρ+1 ≥ aij for all i, with strict inequality if j + ρ ≤ i ≤ 2ρ.
There is at least one i since j ≤ ρ implies j+ρ ≤ 2ρ. Therefore j = ρ+1 dominates
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every j ∈ {2, . . . , ρ}. ¤
Lemma 13: Column n−2ρ+1 dominates every column of A′ in {n− 2ρ+ 2, . . . ,
n− ρ}.
Proof: For any j ∈ {n− 2ρ+ 2, . . . , n− ρ}, the rows where aij = 1 are i ∈
{j, . . . , j + ρ− 1}. Since j ≥ n − 2ρ + 2, the undominated rows among these are
{j, n− ρ}. However, the rows where ai,n−2ρ+1 = 1 are i ∈ {n− 2ρ+ 1, n− ρ}, none
of which are dominated. Therefore, if n− 2ρ + 2 ≤ j ≤ n− ρ, then ai,n−2ρ+1 ≥ aij
for all i, with strict inequality if n− 2ρ+1 ≤ i ≤ j− 1. There is at least one i since
j ≥ n − 2ρ + 2 implies j − 1 ≥ n − 2ρ + 1. Therefore, j = n − 2ρ + 1 dominates
every j ∈ {n− 2ρ+ 2, . . . , n− ρ}. ¤
After applying lemmas 7, 8, 12, and 13, the undominated actions for the players
are:
i ∈ {1} ∪ {ρ+ 1, . . . , n− ρ} ∪ {n}
j ∈ {1} ∪ {ρ+ 1, . . . , n− 2ρ+ 1} ∪ {n− ρ+ 1} ,
and the reduced outcome matrix is
A′ =

1 01×(n−3ρ+1) 0
0(n−2ρ)×1 A(n−2ρ)×(n−3ρ+1) 0(n−2ρ)×1
0 01×(n−3ρ+1) 1
 .
A′ contains the outcome matrix for the game of a corridor with n−2ρ doors, and
one guard with length ρ. The first and last rows cannot dominate or be dominated
by any other rows in A′; the same can be said about the first and last columns.
Therefore, we can apply lemmas 7, 8, 12, and 13 to the middle matrix, multiple
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times. This third case is not a terminating condition like the others; we can repeat
this process of removing 2ρ−2 dominated rows from each set until the middle matrix
reaches case 1 or 2. After s iterations, the resulting sets are:
i ∈ {kρ+ 1}s−1k=0 ∪ {sρ+ 1, . . . , n− sρ} ∪ {n− kρ}s−1k=0
j ∈ {kρ+ 1}s−1k=0 ∪ {sρ+ 1, . . . , n− (s+ 1) ρ+ 1} ∪ {n− (k + 1) ρ+ 1}s−1k=0 ,
and the resulting reduced outcome matrix is
A′ =

Is 0s×C 0s×s
0R×s AR×C 0R×s
0s×s 0s×C Is
 , (6.5)
where R = n− 2sρ, and C = n− (2s+ 1) ρ+ 1.
The middle matrix reaches a terminating condition when R ≤ 3ρ, i.e. s ≥ n
2ρ
− 3
2
.
Therefore, set s = d n
2ρ
− 1
2
e− 1. Furthermore, if R ≤ 2ρ, then the process will reach
Terminating Condition 1, leaving A′ as an identity matrix. This happens when
n− 2sρ ≤ 2ρ, i.e. s ≥ n
2ρ
− 1. Otherwise, it will reach Terminating Condition 2.
Therefore, which terminating condition the domination process will reach de-
pends on whether
d n
2ρ
e = d n
2ρ
− 1
2
e.
Lemma 14: ∀n, ρ ∈ Z+, d n
2ρ
e = d n
2ρ
− 1
2
e iff dn
ρ
e is even.
Proof: If dn
ρ
e is even, then n
ρ
= 2i− f for some i ∈ Z and f ∈ [0, 1). Therefore,
⌈
n
2ρ
⌉
=
⌈
i− f
2
⌉
= i⌈
n
2ρ
− 1
2
⌉
=
⌈
i− f
2
− 1
2
⌉
= i =
⌈
n
2ρ
⌉
,
since f
2
∈ [0, 1
2
)
.
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Similarly, if dn
ρ
e is odd, then n
ρ
= 2i + 1 − f for some i ∈ Z and f ∈ [0, 1).
Therefore,
⌈
n
2ρ
⌉
=
⌈
i+
1
2
− f
2
⌉
= i+ 1⌈
n
2ρ
− 1
2
⌉
=
⌈
i− f
2
⌉
= i 6=
⌈
n
2ρ
⌉
.
since f
2
∈ [0, 1
2
)
.
Therefore, d n
2ρ
e = d n
2ρ
− 1
2
e iff dn
ρ
e is even. ¤
We can use all these lemmas together to find Vm (A).
Theorem 4: The discrete one-corridor game with n doorways and one guard of
width ρ has value Vm (A) =
⌈
n
ρ
⌉−1
.
Proof: Apply lemmas 7, 8, 12, and 13 repeatedly, to reach a terminating
condition. Which condition is reached depends on whether ` = dn
ρ
e is even or odd
(Lemma 14).
If ` is even, the process ends with Terminating Condition 1. Applying lemma
9 reduces A′ to I`, the ` × ` identity matrix. The undominated actions for both
players are:
i ∈ {kρ+ 1}`/2k=0 ∪ {n− kρ}`/2k=0
j ∈ {kρ+ 1}`/2k=0 ∪ {n− (k + 1) ρ+ 1}`/2k=0 .
The equilibrium strategies are y′i = z
′
j =
1
`
for all i, j, and Vm (A
′) = 1
`
.
If ` is odd, the process ends with Terminating Condition 2, and s = `−1
2
. Apply
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lemmas 10 and 11. The resulting reduced outcome matrix is
A′ =

Is+1 0s+1×C 0s+1×s+1
0R×s+1 1R×C 0R×s+1
0s+1×s+1 0s+1×C Is+1
 , (6.6)
where
R = n− 2 (s+ 1) ρ
C = (2s+ 3) ρ− n+ 1.
The undominated actions for both players are
i ∈ {kρ+ 1}sk=0 ∪ {(s+ 1) ρ+ 1, . . . , n− (s+ 1) ρ} ∪ {n− kρ}sk=0
j ∈ {kρ+ 1}sk=0 ∪ {(s+ 1) ρ+ 1, . . . , n− (s+ 2) ρ+ 1} ∪ {n− (k + 1) ρ+ 1}sk=0 .
To obtain equilibrium strategies for this A′, set the y′i and z
′
j values for the rows
and columns of the Is+1 portions of A
′ to 1
`
. These are the rows i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s+ 1,
R + s+ 2, R + s+ 3, . . . , R + 2s+ 2}, and the columns j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s+ 1, C + s
+2, C + s+ 3, . . . , C + 2s+ 2}. For the remaining rows
i ∈ {s+ 2, . . . , R + s+ 1} and j ∈ {s+ 2, . . . , C + s+ 1} any y′i and z′j values such
that
R+s+1∑
i=s+2
y′i =
C+s+1∑
j=s+2
z′j =
1
`
form equilibrium strategies. In other words, each maximal
1a×b block in A′ should be selected by each player with probability 1` . Therefore
Vm (A
′) = 1
`
.
In both cases, Vm (A) = Vm (A
′) = 1
`
=
⌈
n
ρ
⌉−1
, and the equilibrium strategies
are to select each maximal rectangular block of 1’s with probability
⌈
n
ρ
⌉−1
. ¤
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Here are some consequences of the above derivations:
• The value of the game does not depend on the terminating condition.
• If ρ = 1, A′ = A = In, regardless of whether n is even or odd.
• Since Vm is defined by a ceiling function, in many cases increasing ρ does not
increase the coverage value. Only a change in ρ that changes ` will change Vm.
This strategy is not unique. This is because removing dominated rows and
columns can remove saddle points. Furthermore, the dominated rows and columns
can be removed in a different order, resulting in different removed rows, and there-
fore different strategies. For example, in the sequence of dominations used above,
the high-numbered actions and low-numbered actions were dominated in the same
iterations. It is possible to only remove low-numbered actions. This would produce
a different A′, and consequently a different saddle point. However, this multitude
of strategies does not change the game’s value, as (1) all saddle points achieve the
same value, and (2) if P1 selects a strategy from one saddle point, and P2 selects
a strategy from a different saddle point, the resulting strategy pair is also a saddle
point [2]. Therefore, any equilibrium strategy derived from any domination process
is an equilibrium, regardless of how the other player derives his strategy.
We can use these additional saddle points to construct a more general equilibrium
strategy:
• For P1:
1. Select ` =
⌈
n
ρ
⌉
clusters of doorways, such that no two doorways from
different clusters are less than ρ doors apart.
2. Select each cluster with probability 1
`
, and choose any doorway in the
cluster to traverse.
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• For P2:
1. Divide the line of doorways into ` contiguous sections, each of which
contains at most ρ doorways.
2. Select each section with probability 1
`
, and choose any guard that covers
it.
In all of these strategies, Vm =
1
`
. P1 cannot decrease this since there are no
doorways that are not covered with a probability less than 1
`
. P2 cannot increase
this since there are no two clusters that can be covered (even partially) by the same
guard. Therefore, for each possible guard location, there is no set of doorways that
the guard can see that will be selected by P1 with a total probability greater than
1
`
.
6.1.2 Multiple guards
We now consider a corridor with n doorways, covered by m guards, each of which
can guard ρ doorways. Section 6.1.1 is a special case of this, where m = 1. In this
section we use domination to show that guards and intruder should be placed at
positions indicated by the equilibrium strategies from Section 6.1.1.
As in previous examples, P1 chooses his action i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In this example,
P2 chooses
J ∈
{
J1, J2, . . . , J(nm)
}
, where each Jα = {jα1, . . . , jαm}, and each j ∈ {1, . . . , n− ρ
+1} represents a guard at j that sees every i ∈ {j, . . . , j + ρ− 1]. Without loss of
generality, jα1 < jα2 < · · · < jαm.
We define these functions:
iˆ (J) = {i |∃j ∈ J s.t. i ∈ [j, j + ρ− 1]}
Jˆ (i) = {J |∃j ∈ J s.t. i ∈ [j, j + ρ− 1]} .
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In other words, iˆ (J) contains all the doorways that J covers, and Jˆ (i) contains
all the guard deployments that cover i. Since the game outcome is always 1 or 0,
we can thus define domination using iˆ and Jˆ :
• i1 dominates i2 iff Jˆ (i1) ⊂ Jˆ (i2).
• J1 dominates J2 iff iˆ (J1) ⊃ iˆ (J2).
(These relations are strict subset and superset.)
Using this, we follow a domination process that parallels the one used in Section
6.1.1.
Lemma 15: i = 1 dominates every i ∈ {2, . . . , ρ}.
Proof: A deployment J that covers i = 1 must contain j = 1, so Jˆ (1) =
{J |1 ∈ J }. Such a deployment would also cover any i ∈ {2, . . . , ρ}; therefore
Jˆ (1) ⊆ Jˆ (i). Since Jˆ (i) contains other deployments, of which {i, i+ ρ, . . .} is
one example, Jˆ (1) ⊂ Jˆ (i). Therefore, i = 1 dominates i ∈ {2, . . . , ρ}. ¤
Lemma 16: i = n dominates every i ∈ {n− ρ+ 1, . . . , n− 1}.
Proof: A deployment J that covers i = n must contain j = n− ρ+1, so Jˆ (n) =
{J |(n− ρ+ 1) ∈ J }. Such a deployment would also cover any i ∈ {n− ρ+ 1, . . . ,
n− 1}; therefore Jˆ (n) ⊆ Jˆ (i). Since Jˆ (i) contains other deployments, of which
{i− ρ+ 1, i− 2ρ+ 1, . . .} is one example, Jˆ (n) ⊂ Jˆ (i). Therefore, i = n dominates
i ∈ {n− ρ+ 1, . . . , n− 1}. ¤
Compare these two lemmas to lemmas 7 and 8. The next two lemmas demon-
strate domination for columns, which represent guard deployment. While there are
certain parallels to lemmas 12 and 13, these lemmas are very different, as they apply
to multi-guard deployments.
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Lemma 17: For any deployment J that contains a j ∈ {2, . . . , ρ}, there is J ′ that
dominates it.
Proof: Set J ′ = (J − {j}) ∪ {ρ}. The replacement of j with ρ covers additional
doorways between j + ρ and 2ρ − 1, in exchange for no longer covering the door-
ways between j and ρ − 1. But every i ∈ {j, . . . , ρ− 1} is dominated. Therefore
iˆ (J) ⊆ iˆ (J ′). The two sets are equal if some other guard in J covers these new
doorways, i.e. J contains a j′ ∈ {j + 1, . . . , ρ}. If this is so, J ′ contains overlapping
guards; we already know j′ and ρ overlap, and there may be others. Therefore, we
move the overlapping guards to the right until they no longer overlap. This adds
elements to iˆ (J ′) without losing any elements. Let {j1, . . . , jp} ⊂ J be the maximal
set of consecutive overlapping or touching guards starting with j, i.e. j1 = j and
∀q ∈ {1, . . . , p} , jq + ρ ≥ jq+1. Set J ′ = (J − {j1, . . . , jp}) ∪ {ρ, 2ρ, . . . , pρ}. In
either case, iˆ (J) ⊂ iˆ (J ′), so J ′ dominates J . Therefore, any guard deployment that
contains a j ∈ {2, . . . , ρ} is dominated. ¤
Lemma 18: For any deployment J that contains a j ∈ {n− 2ρ+ 2, . . . , n− ρ},
there is J ′ that dominates it.
Proof: Set J ′ = (J − {j})∪ {n− 2ρ+ 1}. The replacement of j with n− 2ρ+1
covers additional doorways between n − 2ρ + 1 and j − 1, in exchange for no
longer covering the doorways between n − ρ + 1 and j + ρ − 1. But every i ∈
{n− ρ+ 1, . . . , j + ρ− 1} is dominated. Therefore iˆ (J) ⊆ iˆ (J ′). The two sets
are equal if some other guard in J covers these new doorways, i.e. J contains a
j′ ∈ {n− 2ρ+ 1, . . . , j − 1}. If this is so, J ′ contains overlapping guards; we already
know j′ and n−2ρ+1 overlap, and there may be others. Therefore, we move the over-
lapping guards to the left until they no longer overlap. This adds elements to iˆ (J ′)
without losing any elements. Let {j1, . . . , jp} ⊂ J be the maximal set of consecutive
overlapping or touching guards ending with j, i.e. jp = j and ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , p} , jq +
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ρ ≥ jq+1. Set J ′ = (J − {j1, . . . , jp})∪{n−(p+ 1) ρ+1, n−pρ+1−jp, . . . , n−2ρ+1}.
In either case (whether iˆ (J) = iˆ (J ′) or not), iˆ (J) ⊂ iˆ (J ′), so J ′ dominates J . There-
fore, any deployment that contains a j ∈ {n− 2ρ+ 2, . . . , n− ρ} is dominated. ¤
We continue this process, analogous to removing guards and intruder actions
described in Section 6.1.1. In this game, instead of removing guards, we remove
deployments containing guards at those locations. Like in Section 6.1.1, the process
stops when looking at the overlapping guards in the middle. These guard locations
are the locations represented by the rectangular block of 1s in the center of (6.6).
Every guard in this area overlaps other guards in this area, but no guard dominates
any other. Any attempt at new dominations will fail, as the J ′ constructed to
dominate J has already been removed by this point. This process terminates with
the same action set for P1; P2’s action set contains only sets of guards from the
final action set in the one-guard game of Section 6.1.1. Therefore, if I and J
are the action sets in the one-guard case for P1 and P2 respectively, then I and
{J |J ⊂ J , |J | = m} are the action sets in the multi-guard case. As in Section 6.1.1,
these strategies are not unique.
We apply strategies from Sections 5.2.1 and 6.1.1 to this game. Set ` =
⌈
n
ρ
⌉
.
The equilibrium strategies are:
• For P1:
1. Select ` clusters of doorways, such that no two doorways from different
clusters are less than ρ doors apart.
2. Select each cluster with probability 1
`
, and choose any doorway in the
cluster to traverse.
• For P2:
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1. Divide the line of doorways into ` contiguous sections, each of which is
at most ρ doorways wide.
2. Select m sections, so that each section is selected with probability m
`
, and
choose any set of guards that cover these m sections.
Notice that the intruder’s strategy depends on n and ρ, but not m.
6.2 One continuous corridor
Consider a single vertical continuous corridor of width w, where there are m guards
with range r. We apply the discrete-to-continuous conversion from Section 5.2.2.
Select an arbitrary horizontal line L and n ∈ N as the number of equal sections in
which to divide L. The discrete examples can approximate the continuous case by
setting ρ = arg min
ρ∈Z+
∣∣ ρ
n
− r
w
∣∣. In other words, select ρ so that ρ
n
best approximates
r
w
. Use the strategy from Section 6.1.2 to determine where P2 will place guards
and which points in L P1 will traverse in intrusion paths. Once P1 has selected
point x ∈ L, the intruder will traverse the vertical line from S1 to S2 through x.
The value of this discrete game is
m
dnρe . As n increases,
ρ
n
approaches r
w
; for large
enough n,
⌈
n
ρ
⌉
=
⌈
w
r
⌉
. Therefore the values of the continuous game is
m
dwr e . The
equilibrium strategies are the same as in Section 6.1.2, only with r, w ∈ R+, and
` =
⌈
w
r
⌉
.
One type of equilibrium strategy for P1 here involves selecting ` vertical paths
that are separated by at least distance r, and using each one with probability 1
`
.
When P1 uses this strategy, no guard can cover multiple candidate paths at once.
Thus the game’s outcome is at most m
`
. In the equilibrium strategies given above,
P2 will cover each segment in the minimum fixed-length barrier with probability
m
`
. Since the intruder must cross one of these segments, the expected outcome is
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m
`
. Therefore the game’s value is Vm =
m
`
. With this in mind, we can construct
equilibrium strategies for any one-corridor environment, vertical or otherwise.
Definition: Paths γ1, . . . , γn are d-distant if ∀t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1] ,∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where i 6= j,
‖γi (t2)− γj (t2)‖ ≥ r. In other words, if paths are d-distant, then they are always
a distance of at least r apart from each other2.
We call a workspace W a corridor if it is simply connected, and S1 and S2
are each one component, and contained in the boundary of W . For a corridor,
all intrusion paths are homotopic to each other, and the minimum variable-length
barrier is a single segment L of length w [13]. Let M = ⌈w
r
⌉
be the size of the
minimum fixed-length barrier, produced by placing guards across the minimum
variable-length barrier. P2’s equilibrium strategy is to place guards across L in the
same manner as the strategy in Section 6.1.2. P1’s strategy is to find M d-distant
intrusion paths, and select each one with equal probability. Each intrusion path
crosses at least one segment in the minimum fixed-length barrier, and each segment
is covered by a guard with probability m
M
. Similarly, each guard can detect at most
one intruder. Therefore the coverage value is m
M
.
It must be shown that it is always possible to construct M d-distant intrusion
paths through W .
Lemma 19: In a single-corridor environment, the maximum number of d-distant
intrusion paths is equal to the size of the minimum fixed-length complete barrier of
guards with length d.
Proof: Let ` be the maximum number of d-distant intrusion paths. Every such
path must cross the minimum barrier; since the paths are d-distant, no two of them
cross the same guard. Therefore ` ≤M .
2In most cases we want the inequality to be strict. However the algorithms used here generally
create paths that are exactly r apart. Therefore we use ≥ instead of >. See Section 6.4.2.
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To show ` ≥ M , construct a set of M d-distant paths. This method parallels
the decomposition method in Section 3.2.2. Since W is a corridor, S1 and S2 are
on its boundary. Therefore they divide ∂W into two components, T1 and T2. Set
γ1 = T1, R1 = Vcirc (γ1), and for each i = 2, . . . ,M , set γi = ∂Ri−1 − ∂W −
i−2⋃
j=1
Rj
and Ri = Vcirc (γi) −
i−2⋃
j=1
Rj. If there is some M
′ ≤ M such that γM ′ is broken into
multiple components, then it intersects T2 at some point p. If so, there is a chain
of M ′ − 1 < M guards from T1 to p ∈ T2. This is a barrier with a length less than
M , which is a contradiction. Therefore, all γi paths are unbroken, and there are M
such paths. ¤
Distant paths resemble thick non-crossing paths [42]. A thick path of thickness
δ (i.e. a δ-thick path) is a path through W , plus all points within distance δ of
the path. The thick-paths problem is that of finding the set of paths of minimum
total length such that (1) the paths connect given endpoints, (2) no thick paths
intersect, and (3) all thick paths are contained inside W , i.e. the thin paths never
get within a distance of δ from obstacles. The minimum thick non-crossing paths for
a particular simply-connected domain can be found in linear time using an algorithm
given in [42]. The only difference between d
2
-thick paths and d-distant paths is the
requirement that thick paths never overlap the boundary. Therefore, this algorithm
can be applied to quickly find minimum d-distant paths for the intruder simply by
removing the step where all points within distance δ from the boundary are removed
from consideration in thick paths.
Notice that for single corridors, the strategies ignore whether the guards are
segments or circles. Here r is the maximum distance across a guard’s visibility
region, which is the length of a segment and the diameter of a circle.
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6.3 General polygonal environments
In this section we apply the concepts from the previous section to partial coverage
strategies in general environments. We show how to combine full coverage, d-distant
paths, and mixed game theory strategies to produce equilibrium strategies for both
players. In Section 6.3.1, we show how d-distant paths apply directly to intruder
strategies. In Section 6.3.2, we show that for segment guards, the strategies do not
come directly from d-distant paths, but can be determined by manipulating the
strategies from Section 6.3.1.
6.3.1 Circles
Consider an arbitrary polygonal environmentW , where S1 and S2 can be separated
by a minimum ofM guards with radius r = d
2
. If there are m < M available guards,
P2 can guarantee an outcome of at least m
M
by placing guards so that each guard
in the complete barrier is covered with equal probability.
Now we show that P1 can guarantee an outcome of at most m
M
by using d-distant
paths. If P1 selects ` d-distant paths, then each guard can only cover at most one
intrusion path. Therefore, if P1 selects each path with equal probability, then he
will be detected with a probability of m
`
. It remains to show that ` = M , even in
the presence of holes and multiple Si components.
Theorem 5: In general polygonal environments, the maximum number of d-
distant paths is equal to the size of the minimum fixed-radius complete circle barrier
of guard with diameter d.
Proof: This theorem, and the proof, parallel the max-flow/min-cut duality [23].
Here, a cut is a complete barrier, and a flow is a set of d-distant paths. We will
use augmenting paths to show that max flow=min cut in this environment, i.e.
maximum number of d-distant paths = minimum complete barrier.
110
Let ` be the maximum number of d-distant intrusion paths, and M be the
number of guards in the minimum circle barrier. As with Lemma 19, every d-
distant intrusion path must cross the minimum barrier, and since the paths are
d-distant, every path must cross a different guard. Therefore ` ≤M .
To show ` ≥M , consider a set of d-distant paths γ1, . . . , γM ′ , whereM ′ < M . We
will show that one more intrusion path γ∗ can be added. This γ∗ is an augmenting
path. It only moves through portions of W where either (1) there are no paths
within distance d, (2) the paths within distance d are in the opposite direction, or
(3) the paths move through corridors where there is room for one more path. Once
γ∗ is found, d-distant paths γ′1, . . . , γ
′
M ′+1 can be constructed.
To show γ∗ exists, consider all points reachable from S1 while remaining d-distant
from the γi paths. If at least one such point is in S2, then finding a γ∗ to connect S1
to this point is straightforward. If not, consider every corridor containing γi paths
that prevent the insertion of a γ∗.
If every intrusion path γ∗ goes through a corridor where the number of γi paths
is maximal and the paths move in the same direction as γ∗, then one can construct
a minimum barrier by taking the union of the minimum barrier of each of the fully-
utilized corridors. There will be one guard per γi path, otherwise some paths would
be oriented in the opposite direction (i.e. moving away from S2 and towards S1).
This is a minimum barrier of M ′ < M , which contradicts that the minimum barrier
is of size M . Therefore, there is a γ∗ that crosses only corridors where the γi paths
move in the opposite direction, or there is room for at least one more d-distant path.
Once γ∗ is found, it is used to construct γ′1, . . . , γ
′
M ′+1. If γ
∗ is already a distance
of d away from all other paths, then γ′i = γi for i = 1, . . . ,M
′, and γ′M ′−1 = γ
∗.
If γ∗ traverses a corridor in the opposite direction as the paths γi1 , . . . , γig , or-
dered in the same order γ∗ approaches them, then the γ′i paths can be found by
rearranging pieces of these paths. For each j, let pj and qj be the points where γij
111
(a) Before (b) After
Figure 6.2: Augmenting path moving opposite directions as distant paths. Dashed
lines are relevant boundaries of thick paths.
respectively enters and leaves the r-thick path about γ∗. Similarly, let p∗ be the
point where γ∗ enters the r-thick path about γi1 , and let q
∗ be the point where
γ∗ exits the r-thick path about γig . Then for j = 1, . . . , g − 1, γ′ij is the portion
of γij from S1 to xj, followed by the line segment from pj to qj+1, followed by the
portion of γij+1 from qj+1 to S2. γ′M ′+1 is the portion of γ∗ from S1 to p∗, followed
by the line from p∗ to q1, followed by the portion of γi1 from q1 to S2. Similarly,
γ′g is the portion of γig from S1 to pg, followed by the line segment from pg to q∗,
followed by the portion of γ∗ from q∗ to S2. For all other i, γ′i = γi. See Figure 6.2
for an example. This step is analogous to reducing flow through an edge e via an
augmenting path in the opposite direction of the flow through e.
If γ∗ traverses a corridor of width greater than kd along with paths γi1 , . . . , γik ,
the paths can be adjusted to make room for γ∗. Construct a corridor starting at the
point where γ∗ enters the d-thick path of some γij and ending at the point where γ
∗
leaves the d-thick path of some γij′ . This corridor has thickness greater than k, so all
k+1 paths can be d-distant, and connect with the paths outside the corridor. Each
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(a) Before (b) After
Figure 6.3: Augmenting path adding to distant paths. The light grey area is the
corridor in which the new path is found.
γ′ij consists of the portions of γij outside the corridor, plus the new d-distant path
inside the corridor. γ′M ′+1 is defined analogously from γ
∗. For all other i, γ′i = γi.
See Figure 6.3 for an example. This step is analogous to increasing flow through an
edge e via an augmenting path in the direction of the flow through e.
Both of these steps can be applied multiple times if relevant. For example, if
γ∗ crosses two different corridors in the opposite direction as the γi paths. After
applying them enough times, the result is M ′ + 1 d-distant paths. Therefore, any
set of fewer than M d-distant paths can be added to, so the maximum number of
d-distant paths must be M . ¤
Since the number of d-distant paths is the same as the number of guards in the
minimum circle barrier, both players can use this to construct equilibrium strategies.
P1 finds M d-distant intrusion paths, and selects each one with probability 1
M
. P2
selects a minimum circle barrier, and covers each guard location with probability
m
M
. The resulting value is Vm =
m
M
.
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6.3.2 Segments
In this section, we look at the problem of partial barrier coverage where there are
m segment guards of length r. We will take the results from Section 6.3.1, and alter
them to suit segment guards.
P2’s strategy is the same for segments as for circles. P2 finds a minimum fixed-
length segment barrier, and places each of his m guards so that each segment in the
minimum barrier is covered with a probability m
M
, where M is the number of guards
in the minimum barrier. Since the intruder has to cross one of these segments, the
outcome is at least m
M
.
In the previous section, we saw that there is an equivalence between circle barriers
and distant paths. This is in part because two paths can be covered by the same
guard diameter d iff the distance between them is less than d. This is not true
of segment guards. Thus P1’s strategy with segment guards is different from the
strategy in Section 6.3.1. We will see examples where paths that are within r cannot
be covered by a single guard. Such situations happen when the minimum radius-r
circle barrier contains fewer guards than the minimum length-2r segment barrier.
Section 4.3.1 gives the three cases that lead to the segment barrier being larger
than the circle barrier. For each case, we show how to select appropriate intruder
paths.
For polygonal curve guard chains like in Figure 4.7, P1 selects paths such that
any two paths that are within r of each other can only be connected by line segments
through Si. Figure 6.4 shows an example of this.
If the minimum circle barrier contains a guard covering an entire Si component,
which would require multiple segment guards, P1 surrounds the Si component with
the minimum number of necessary segment guards, and chooses a path through each
guard with equal probability.
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(a) Circles (b) Segments
Figure 6.4: Guards and corresponding intrusion paths.
In circle barriers where one guard touches multiple obstacles or guards, P1
constructs twice as many intruder paths, and traverses each one with probability
1
2M
, i.e. half as often as a regular path. Figure 6.5 shows the candidate paths for
the example workspace from Figure 4.8(b). To guarantee each segment guard is
traversed with equal probability 1
2
, each segment must be traversed with probability
1
4
.
This gives P1 a set of paths he can select so that each path selected with proba-
bility 1
M
can only be detected by one guard, and each path selected with probability
1
2M
has at most one other such path that crosses the same guard. Since each such
guard is covered with probability m
M
, the outcome is at most m
M
. Therefore, the
game’s value is m
M
.
6.4 Additional notes
6.4.1 Intractability
For both types of guards and both players, finding the optimal strategy is NP-
Complete. The problem of finding the minimum barrier is NP-Complete, as proven
in [13] (for segments) and Section 4.1 (for circles). The problem of finding maximum
d-distant paths is NP-Complete, as proven in [42]. Therefore, both players are likely
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Figure 6.5: Intruder paths for environment in Figure 4.8. Any dashed pair of the
same color is a segment barrier.
to use approximate methods to give strategies that approach equilibrium. P1 may
use fewer paths (raising the outcome), and P2 may choose more locations in which
to deploy guards (decreasing the outcome).
6.4.2 Closed guards
The sensor model used throughout this work assumes a guard with range r can
see points at a distance up and including r. Therefore, if two paths are a distance
r apart, a perfectly placed guard can cover both of them. Therefore, equilibrium
intruder strategies require paths that are more than r apart.
However, the algorithms given are designed to construct paths that are exactly r
apart. Therefore, in these cases it is preferable to use r+²-distant paths, for a small
enough ² that adding it to r does not change the number of paths. For example,
if the minimum barrier consists of chains of lengths w1, . . . , wn, each chain i will
contain mi =
⌈
wi
r
⌉
guards. Therefore, if ² < min
i
wi−rmi
mi
, then guards of length r+ ²
116
will produce the same mi values. Therefore r + ² is a suitable distance to separate
intruder paths.
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Chapter 7
Future research
This chapter describes some other directions that can be taken in barrier coverage.
7.1 General intruders and guards
We can extend the barrier coverage problem definition in the case where the intruder
is not a point, but a moving object with some configuration space Q and free space
Qfree ⊂ Q, possibly with motion constraints. The sets S1, S2, and V (qj) retain
their meaning, only now they are subsets of Qfree. This reflects that in this case we
are concerned with start, goal, and visibility configurations, not just locations.
In many cases, S1, S2, and V (qj) are effectively sets of locations. For example,
guards see intruders in specific regions of space, regardless of how they are oriented.
In these cases, it is worthwhile to define S˜1, S˜2, and V˜ (qj) as, respectively, the set
of start locations, stop locations, and locations seen by guards. If the intruder has
the volume function R : Q → Rm, (A robot at q ∈ Q resides in R (q) ⊂ Rm), then
we can write:
S1 =
{
q ∈ Qfree
∣∣∣R (q) ∩ S˜1 6= ∅}
S2 =
{
q ∈ Qfree
∣∣∣R (q) ∩ S˜2 6= ∅}
V (qi) =
{
q ∈ Qfree
∣∣∣R (q) ∩ V˜ (qi) 6= ∅}
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We can also invert these definitions, e.g. define S˜1 in terms of S1.
This general definition can be used to represent three dimensions, multiple in-
truders, intruders with motion constraints (e.g. nonholonomic intruders, dynamic
constraints, etc.), intruders with volume, intruders that change shape, etc.
We can extend the definition of guards the same way. Each guard qj has a config-
uration space Qj. Each guard can have a different configuration space, representing
a set of guards with different properties, for example, guards that have to be on the
ground, along walls or ceilings, or on specific tracks (for motion or power purposes).
Each Qj would have its own Vj : Qj → P (Q), where P (Q) is the power set of
Q. This can be used to define various types of guards, like lines, segments, circles,
cylinders, spheres, etc.
This definition permits guards in three dimensions. A single line is of limited
use in three dimensions. But a set of lines close enough together can function like a
plane if the intruder has volume. This could also be generated by one quick-moving
line. A sector or a cone could be produced similarly.
7.2 Noisy sensors
In previous chapters we have assumed that a sensor will always detect an intruder
that enters the sensor’s range. That is not always a realistic assumption. There is
usually a level of noise in the sensing, so there is some nonzero probability of a false
negative. This can be modeled simply by a probability of failure, or more elaborately
as a probability function, where the location relative to the sensor affects the sensor’s
accuracy. In either case, one can replace the visibility functions Vseg, Vcirc, etc. used
throughout the previous chapters with probability functions PVi : Qi ×W → [0, 1],
where PVi (qi, p) is the probability that a guard with configuration qi can see an
intruder at p. For example, the further away the intruder is from the sensor, the
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less likely the sensor is to detect him. Also, the environment may be a factor: there
may be regions that are better lit, dustier, etc., and this may affect sensor accuracy.
7.2.1 Exposure
In a common model for sensors, the probability of a guard detecting an intruder
is a function of the intruder’s location relative to the guards, and the time the
intruder spends in range. One way of modeling this is with a Sensor Field Intensity
value [35]. For a single intruder location, each sensor has an intensity value, e.g.
S (s, p) =
λ
[d (s, p)]K
where d (s, p) is the Euclidean distance between the sensor s and the point p, and
positive constants λ and K are system parameters. This represents the simple
example where the further away an intruder is, the less likely he is to be detected.
The sensor model may incorporate additional environmental factors.
The entire field has an intensity value I (p) defined by combining the individual
sensor intensities. This could be a weighted sum of all sensor values, or the highest
value. The exposure over a single intruder path γ : [0, 1]→W is then
E (γ) =
∫ 1
0
I (γ (t))
∣∣∣∣dγdt
∣∣∣∣ dt.
This value can be converted to a probability.
p (γ) = 1− e−E(γ)
This p (γ) can be used as the value of the intruder/guard game. As before, the
intruder seeks to minimize this, while the guard deployer seeks to maximize it.
A relevant concept is the minimum exposure path [35,52]. This is the path that
120
minimizes E for a given sensor deployment. For the distance-only model described
above, this path traverses edges of the Voronoi diagram of the sensor locations. An
intruder that knows where the guards are will traverse this path. An intruder that
does not know the guard locations will seek the path of minimum expected exposure.
This will produce game strategies like in the deterministic sensor case.
7.2.2 k-coverage
The concept of k-coverage from [31] may be useful here. A passage is k-covered if
it is impossible for an intruder to travel from one end of the passage to the other
without passing through k sensors’ visibility regions. If the probability of a single
failure is p, the probability of crossing the passage completely unseen is pk. If the
probability depends on location relative to the guard, then the guards could be
staggered so that one guard sees well where another sees poorly.
We define a k-barrier to be a guard deployment that k-covers every intrusion
path. We show that for segment barriers (variable or fixed length), a minimum
k-barrier can be found by deploying k copies of the minimum 1-barrier. We then
show the same for circles.
Lemma 20: A segment k-barrier where no two guards’ interiors intersect is com-
posed of k disjoint 1-barriers.
Proof: We prove this inductively by demonstrating that every k-barrier B can
be separated into a 1-barrier B1 and a (k − 1)-barrier Bk−1 where the two barriers
are disjoint. This is trivially true for k = 1.
For each intrusion path, consider the first guard that the path crosses. The
1-barrier B1 is the set of all such guards for all intrusion paths. This is a 1-barrier
since every intrusion path must cross at least one guard.
To show that Bk−1 = B − B1 is a (k − 1)-barrier, it suffices to show that every
intrusion path crosses at least k−1 guards in Bk−1. Prove by contradiction: suppose
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(a) Guards intersect (b) Guards do not intersect
Figure 7.1: Equivalent segment guards
this is not the case. Then there exists a path α that crosses k − i guards in Bk−1,
where i > 1. Since B is a k-guard, α must cross at least k guards in B. Therefore,
α crosses at least i guards in B1. Let g
∗ be the last such guard. By construction
there exists a path β which crosses g∗ before any other guard in B. Express α
as α1 · α2, where α1 connects S1 to g∗, and α1 connects g∗ to S1. Express β as
β1 · β2 analogously. The intrusion path β1 · α2 crosses k − i + 1 < k guards, which
contradicts the fact that B is a k-barrier. Therefore no such path exists, and Bk−1
is a (k − 1)-barrier.
Continuing this process decomposes B into k 1-barriers. ¤
This method of extracting individual barriers also gives an order for guards. An
intruder will go through the first extracted 1-barrier, then the second, etc. until
the last. This concept breaks down when guards can intersect, like in Figure 7.1(a).
There are paths in the same homotopy class that traverse g1 and g2 in opposite
orders. In the proof below, we will use the fact that there are equivalent deployments
like 7.1(b) that do not intersect.
Theorem 6: The minimum segment k-barrier consists of k copies of the minimum
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segment 1-barrier.
Proof: Let W be the length of the minimum segment barrier. Since according
to Lemma 20 any non-intersecting segment k-barrier consists of k 1-barriers, its
total length must be at least kW . This is achieved with n copies of the minimum
1-barrier.
Now consider a k-barrier where the guards do intersect. We know from Theorem
1 in Section 2.2 and the circle guard discussion in Section 4.3.1 that any set of
intersecting guards can be replaced with non-intersecting guards of equal or lesser
length, then any intersecting k-barrier is at least as long as some non-intersecting
k-barrier, which is at least as long as k minimum 1-barriers.
Therefore, k minimum 1-barriers is a minimum k-barrier. ¤
Theorem 7: The minimum circle k-barrier consists of k copies of the minimum
segment 1-barrier.
Proof: If a circle guard deployment, after being converted to its equivalent seg-
ment guard (see Section 4.3.1), contains no intersections, then proceed as in Theorem
6.
If the circles still intersect, there are three possibilities:
• Chains intersect (Figure 7.2). Use the same methods as in Theorems 1 and 6
to shorten and separate them.
• Individual circles overlap (Figure 7.3). In this case, either (1) intruders can
always choose one circle to traverse and ignore the other (the vertical paths),
or (2) intruders always both circles in the same order (the horizontal path).
The only way to make this impossible is to use such a narrow corridor that the
circles can be moved to coincide (see below). Therefore, there is no conflict
like with segments.
• Circles coincide. In this case, merely assign an order that allows the algorithm
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(a) Chains cross (b) Chains touch (c) Chains do not intersect
Figure 7.2: Intersecting circle guard chains can be rearranged to form nonintersect-
ing chains.
Figure 7.3: Overlapping circle guards.
in Lemma 20 to succeed: if g1 and g2 coincide, and γ crosses it n times, gi
is crossed first on odd-numbered crossings, and gj is crossed first on the even
numbered crossings. This puts gi in the 1-barrier immediately before gj.
Therefore, every circle k-barrier is at least as long as k copies of the minimum
circle k-barrier. ¤
A likely practical constraint is that guards be a certain distance apart. In such
cases, start with the minimum barrier of the given guard type, then use the algorithm
in Section 3.2.3 to find the shortest barrier that does not touch the first barrier. It
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(a) Minimum and second-minimum barriers (b) Minimum barrier pair
Figure 7.4: If guards must be a distance apart, the minimum 2-barrier is not always
the minimum plus by the second-minimum.
will be necessary to make two modifications: (1) add edges corresponding to placing
the second barrier next to the first, and (2) look for cases like Figure 7.4, where the
minimum barrier pair does not contain the minimum barrier. Such cases require
that the two barriers be adjacent.
7.2.3 Tracking
A guard may also have false positives, and it may be undesirable to have guards
sound alarms, shut down the system, etc., if there is no intrusion attempt. In this
case, it will be necessary for multiple nearby guards to see an intruder in order for the
system to consider an intruder to be detected. This relates to the general problem
of tracking in sensor networks [34]. This is the problem of determining the location
and course of an object moving through a sensor field. In the deterministic sensor
case, it is only necessary to detect the intruder once. If there is a possibility of a
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false positive, the sensors will need to communicate and work together to determine
if they really are seeing an intruder. For example, the intruder should trip multiple
sensors in a realistic order. Such a situation will also require a level of k-coverage. If
there is only one guard protecting an area, there is no way of confirming or denying
the sensor results.
7.3 Sleeping sensors
Sensors often have limited power resources. One way to conserve energy is to be
active a portion of the time and sleep the rest of the time. If the guards all sleep
with independent schedules, or randomly, then they can be treated the same as
probabilistic sensors. In [30], k-coverage is applied to a network of sensors that
sleep.
Alternatively, the guards can synchronize their sleep patterns so that a com-
plete k-barrier is up at any time, for some k. This can be done using predefined
clock settings, or by checking neighbors’ sleep/wake settings. There are existing
algorithms to schedule sleep that maintain area coverage [53], and that maintain
connectivity [6]. Maintaining a barrier would involve elements of both: maintain
a connected line between sides of a corridor, while keeping a high level of barrier
coverage.
7.4 Guard motion
It is possible to use guards that can move while the intruder is moving through
W . In a complete barrier, guards do not move, as there is no advantage of doing
so. However in partial coverage scenarios, guards may find it advantageous to move
around to cover partially-covered barrier candidates, or to move from component to
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path component. Guard motion affects the intruder’s path, but it can also affect
the intruder’s path’s homotopy class if the motion is dependent on location (e.g. if
it is based on terrain).
Mobile guards have speed bounds, and may have kinematic and dynamic con-
straints as well. All of these constraints may be dependent on the guard’s location
in the workspace. The intruder will also have constraints, but they may be different.
For example, the intruder may be on the ground while the guards are on the ceiling.
Similarly, the guards may be wheeled robots which move better on smooth terrain,
while the intruder is a walking robot which moves better on rough terrain. Each
guard may have its own set of constraints.
On the simplest level, the coverage value for moving guards is the average over
time of the stationary guard coverage values. However, if the guards are moving
fast enough, they can intercept an intruder who was just in the gap between them
and lacks enough time and maneuverability to escape. In this case mobile guards
are preferable to stationary guards.
7.5 Environment motion
Environment motion involves moving walls, doors, and other changes to the terrain
over time. As with guard motion, this happens without any knowledge of the
intruder’s location, and can be scheduled or randomized. However, unlike guard
motion, this happens with a pattern that is not strategic, and is known to the
guards and the intruder.
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7.6 Network connectivity
The guards need to communicate with each other in order to work together. If
they are communicating over a wireless network (which will be necessary if they
are moving, or outside), this will add constraints. Each guard is a node in the
wireless network, and each will have a communications range. They may also have
line-of-site requirements (for example, if they use infrared to communicate). It may
be necessary to add guards that don’t see anything, but can relay messages. This
places a trade-off between a shorter barrier with far-apart components and a larger
barrier with components closer together.
Just because two nodes are within communications range does not mean they can
communicate. There is always the possibility of random communications failure, and
sometimes the environment is a factor. This adds to the false negative probability:
a guard that sees an intruder but cannot communicate this detection with other
guards has the same effect as a guard that does not see an intruder. Therefore
the guards should always be alert for network disconnection. The guards need to
know what to do if the communication network divides into multiple components;
they also need to minimize this possibility. An intruder may also choose to jam
the network to get through, or jam the network in a different place to misdirect
the guards. Now a robust network becomes an additional requirement, to balance
against minimum cost.
7.7 Deployment motion planning
The work in previous chapters is concerned with the locations in which to deploy
guards. It is not concerned with how to get the guards to their desired locations.
While one could simply select a deployment and use a simple algorithm to implement
it, there are other ways to combine selection with implementation.
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• Deploy on the fly using incremental methods. For example, use gradient de-
scent on the barrier’s current properties, and have each robot plan motion
separately.
• Once the target deployment is found, plan a search or sweep algorithm start-
ing from the current deployment to minimize the chance that an invader has
reached its goal before the deployment finishes.
7.8 Suboptimal deployments
Chapters 5 and 6 give solutions for optimal partial coverage in situations where
the guards can choose where to deploy. However, in some situations, guards are
deployed randomly (e.g. random walks, airdropped sensors, etc.). In this case, the
coverage will not be optimal, and the intruder will not necessarily move with the
same assumptions.
One can use the intruder paths from Section 5.3.2 as P1’s strategy, and deter-
mine the coverage value to be the percentage of these paths covered by the guard
deployment. However, it may give an artificially high value. In situations like in
Figure 7.5, the intruder has an undetected intrusion path. However, if the intruder
were to follow the equilibrium strategy, they would always be detected. Situations
like this produce a discrepancy between the value determined by the above method,
and a meaningful coverage value. Therefore new intruder strategies must be devised.
Guard strategies are also relevant here, but in a different capacity than before. A
randomized deployment strategy (based on a distribution over W , rather than over
the minimum barrier) would aim to maximize the expected coverage value. A post-
deployment motion strategy could help randomized mobile guards to move towards
a locally-optimal deployment. One example of such a post-deployment strategy is to
follow the intruder paths, but redirected toward the minimum barrier. This would
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Figure 7.5: These intruder paths avoid the guards. However, all equilibrium intruder
paths are vertical, and would be detected.
ultimately place all guards along the minimum barrier.
7.9 Multiple intrusion attempts
In the standard game for partial barriers, the intruder can make one intrusion at-
tempt based on his current knowledge (or lack thereof) to intrude. If the intruder
can make multiple attempts (each one ends upon successful guard detection), then
the game becomes a learning process. Each player tries to learn the other’s strategy.
In this scenario, the intruder P1 and the guard deployer P2 play a game where
the outcome is the number of intrusion attempts used to successfully reach S2. P1
seeks to minimize this, and P2 seeks to maximize it.
Guard motion, briefly described in Section 7.4, affects the game. The speed
constraints on the intruder can be relaxed, provided there is a time interval between
attempts. This would mean the guards can reposition within bounds after each
turn. Due to the turn-based nature of the game, there are three possibilities for
motion constraints.
• Stationary guards
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• Moving guards, bounded intruder speed
• Moving guards, unbounded intruder speed (with gaps between attempts)
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